

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1204879-001

Total Deleted Page(s) = 62

Page 27 ~ b3 - Per CIA and FBI; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 28 ~ b3 - Per CIA; b7E;
Page 29 ~ b3 - Per CIA; b7E;
Page 30 ~ b3 - Per CIA; b7E;
Page 31 ~ b3 - Per CIA; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 32 ~ b3 - Per CIA; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 35 ~ b3 - Per CIA and FBI; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 36 ~ b7D;
Page 37 ~ b3 - Per CIA and FBI; b7D; b7E;
Page 38 ~ b3 - Per CIA and FBI; b7D; b7E;
Page 39 ~ b7D;
Page 40 ~ b3 - Per CIA and FBI; b7D; b7E;
Page 41 ~ b7D;
Page 42 ~ b3 - Per CIA and FBI; b7D; b7E;
Page 43 ~ b3 - Per CIA and FBI; b7D; b7E;
Page 44 ~ b7D;
Page 45 ~ b7D;
Page 46 ~ b7D;
Page 47 ~ b7D;
Page 48 ~ b7D;
Page 49 ~ b7D;
Page 50 ~ b7D;
Page 51 ~ b3 - Per CIA; b7D; b7E;
Page 52 ~ b3 - Per CIA; b7D; b7E;
Page 53 ~ b3 - Per CIA; b7D; b7E;
Page 54 ~ b3 - Per CIA; b7D; b7E;
Page 55 ~ b3 - Per CIA; b7D; b7E;
Page 56 ~ b7D;
Page 57 ~ b7D;
Page 58 ~ b7D;
Page 59 ~ b7D;
Page 60 ~ b7D;
Page 61 ~ b7D;
Page 69 ~ Duplicate;
Page 73 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;
Page 74 ~ b7D;
Page 83 ~ Duplicate;
Page 84 ~ Duplicate;
Page 117 ~ b3 - Per CIA and FBI; b7E;
Page 118 ~ b3 - Per CIA and FBI; b7E;
Page 131 ~ Duplicate;
Page 132 ~ Duplicate;
Page 136 ~ Duplicate;
Page 137 ~ Duplicate;
Page 138 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;
Page 139 ~ b7D;
Page 140 ~ b7D;
Page 141 ~ b3 - Per CIA and FBI; b7D; b7E;
Page 142 ~ b3 - Per CIA and FBI; b7D; b7E;
Page 143 ~ b7D;
Page 144 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;
Page 146 ~ b7D;
Page 147 ~ b7D;
Page 151 ~ Duplicate;
Page 152 ~ Duplicate;
Page 153 ~ Duplicate;
Page 154 ~ Duplicate;
Page 174 ~ b7D;
Page 181 ~ b3 - Per CIA and FBI; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 182 ~ b7D;
Page 184 ~ b3 - Per CIA and FBI; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 185 ~ b3 - Per CIA and FBI; b7D; b7E;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



RHC:AWK
80-604

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

September 28, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. COFFEY

Re: ~~Secret Ink Research and~~
Reference Notes.

There are attached hereto some hundred and forty-six pages of handwritten notes pertaining to laboratory research on secret inks and general information having a bearing on secret ink examinations. These notes have been carefully classified and abstracted on 5 x 8 cards and an appropriate index prepared for the abstracts. The file and index are being maintained in the Secret Ink Unit.

In accordance with your request, the secret ink examiners have discontinued the policy of making notes of this type, such information now being placed in the file referred to above. This file is used frequently from day to day as a means of obtaining background information with respect to the materials, techniques, peculiarities, et cetera of individual cases which may have a bearing on the secret ink examination.

The attached notes, the subject of this memorandum, are to be placed in the secret ink file, 80-604, as a single serial.

Respectfully,

T. F. Baughman

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Piper
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy




OCT 6 1944

RECORDED & INDEXED

EX-33

SEP 30 1944



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 26, 1944

RED:MR

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. COFFEY

Re; German ^④ Secret Writing Ink.
Dispatch No. 2856, dated August 4, 1944,
from the American Embassy, Madrid, Spain,
to the State Department
Spain - Esp. G

This ink, when examined, was found to contain [] and a small amount of [] which is probably an impurity. Tests indicate that it is [] in aqueous solution.

b3 Per CIA
b7E

It is known by the Bureau that [] is employed as a secret ink by the Germans, and several subjects of cases in the past have been given the same instructions for its use as contained in the reference memorandum. b3 Per CIA
b7E

This particular concentration is less than .001 per cent [] thus making it a very difficult ink to detect. The reagent, [] acid, that is being used in routine checks for [] would not reveal this weak solution if protected. Only a reagent such as [] that permanently stains a document, can be used to develop the ink, the use of which would require that the treated document be condemned or simulated.

Research is being conducted to perfect a more sensitive developer for [] that will be nonstaining.

Most of the ink was used in the instant analysis. The remainder will be retained in the Laboratory to be employed as a control for research.

Respectfully,

D. J. Parsons

RECORDED
EX-11

80-604-385
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
OCT 11 1944
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

J. EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

September 15, 1944

TFB:AL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. COFFEY

Re: Testing Letters for Secret
Ink in SIS Field Offices

Reference is made to the attached memorandum addressed to Mr. Carson by Mr. W. R. Hulbert, Jr. in which it is suggested that the Laboratory be requested to furnish a memorandum to all Legal Attaches outlining a method of spraying letters for the development of secret writing when the secret writing material

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hendon
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Piper
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

b3 Per CIA
b7E

I have discussed this matter with the secret ink chemists and it is believed that this would be highly undesirable and contrary to the Bureau's general practice of having Laboratory examinations conducted in the field and certainly Laboratory examinations conducted by other than qualified technicians. There is basically no reason why all types of spraying treatments should not be conducted in the field if you are going to conduct one type of spraying there. The spraying method of developing secret writing is simple when in the hands of an expert but it is certainly not a simple procedure in the sense that any agent can conduct such an examination.

Censorship has not yet perfected a good spraying technique and in the FBI Laboratory not only is the work done by qualified technicians but there is much technical equipment available for use as well as appropriate photographic equipment for the prompt photographing of any writing developed.

Respectfully,

T. F. Baughman

Attachment

RECORDED

31 SEP 18 1944



OCT 10 1944

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

WRH:FJS

TO : MR. C. H. CARSON *CHC*

DATE: AUGUST 23, 1944

FROM : MR. W. R. HULBERT, JR.

SUBJECT: TESTING LETTERS FOR SECRET INK IN THE SIS FIELD

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Jones
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Beahm

A number of SIS offices have been furnished with a portable ultra-violet light for use in inspecting documents for secret writing.

It has been found that in a number of the espionage cases handled in Latin America a popular method of secret writing was the use of pure [redacted] Another form which has been used is [redacted] The latter ink will respond to the ultra-violet light and can be readily observed with an occasional inspection by that means. The [redacted] on the other hand, does not fluoresce and consequently, where the SIS representatives are unable to send the original letter to the Laboratory for examination of writings made with pure [redacted] will go undetected.

b3 Per CIA

b3 Per CIA
b7E

It is therefore suggested that the Laboratory be requested to furnish a memorandum to all Legal Attachés, outlining this simple method of treatment to be used when it is impossible to submit the original specimen to the Laboratory for examination. It is felt that this method will be of unusual value and interest to those offices where regular mail coverage in espionage cases may be had and where the distance from Washington is so great that letters cannot be submitted for Laboratory examination.

ENCLOSURE

memo 44-
RECORDED
9-13

100-604-305

F B I
31 SEP 18 1944

22

10/1

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: 10/6/44

FROM : Mr. C. D. Marron

CDM:ed

80-604

SUBJECT: GERMAN SECRET WRITING INK

Reference is made to the memorandum from Mr. Horace Peters, OSS, to the writer captioned as above dated August 17, 1944. Mr. Peters is interested in knowing whether this Bureau has found the secret writing ink as described in the referenced memorandum in any of the secret ink cases that we have developed. He also questioned the writer as to whether this material had been made available to Censorship.

Mr. Peters was advised that his inquiries would be made known to the appropriate authorities and that he would be advised at a later date.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Jones
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

SECRET Writing
Mr. Marron
advising this
now for 10-17-44

Censorship was
advised of this ink
by third memo dated
9/22/44. CBS-

Peters advised
10-16-44
C.D.M.

RECORDED & INDEXED

80-604-306

16 OCT 18 1944

62 OCT 21 1944

Filers

MR. D. M. LADD

9/28/44

WJP:ed

Mr. W. J. Powell

Reference is made to the attached memoranda from Mr. J. A. Martin of the Bureau Laboratory to Mr. Coffey dated August 29, 1944, and September 19, 1944, respectively.

The referenced memorandum dated August 29th refers to a code system being used by Censorship to indicate when privileged or diplomatic mail has been censored. This is done by stamping with an even figure when it has not been opened and an odd figure when it has been opened, according to Colonel Carlson of the Office of Censorship.

The Laboratory memorandum sets out Mr. Appel's apprehension relative to this system, and states that it is quite possible for the enemy to ascertain what treatment particular lines of communication are receiving.

At the outset it may be stated that the Office of Censorship is active in the censoring of some diplomatic channels and that agency is doing so on their own initiative. The Bureau has never requested such activity, and it appears desirable not to inject ourselves into this operation by any means whatsoever. Since it is Censorship's sole responsibility, it does not appear desirable for the Bureau to suggest or dictate the method in which diplomatic censoring is to be handled. As you know, the Bureau is receiving material from this type of Censorship, and it is being routed throughout the Bureau to the interested Supervisors with the identifying stamp "Cadet". Censorship has offered this material and we are accepting it; however, we are taking no part in the censoring operation and to make suggestions regarding

RECEIVED IN

b7D

relative to a change or discontinuance of same would be to inject ourselves into this highly secretive operation being conducted solely by Censorship. It is noted that Mr. Martin also makes the observation in the referenced memorandum that he cannot see a great deal of advantage in taking such a matter up with Censorship from the Laboratory's standpoint; however, the suggestion is made that the Security Division may see some reason to do so.

Mr. Tolson — Censorship's system of marking is also dealt with in the referenced memorandum dated September 19th. Here, however, the subject matter deals with Censorship's code marks being placed on original communications intercepted by it in ordinary and routine mail channels. This mail, of course, Censorship has a legal right to censor and is, therefore, outside of the diplomatic channel which is dealt with above. Mr. Appel makes the observation that the system presently being used by Censorship in marking original envelopes to indicate treatment of a certain kind can be readily detected by the enemy. To clarify this problem relative to the Censorship markings, the following is set out.

RECORDED

Mr. Coffey — When an original letter is received in a Postal Censorship Station, it necessarily has to receive certain mechanical treatment by the Censorship employees and due to the tremendous amount of mail received daily, duplication must be avoided. Every letter received is matched against the watch list names to ascertain whether or not the sender of the communication is on the watch list by certain employees designated to do so. When this operation is complete, each letter receives a crayon circular mark

Miss Gandy

74 OCT 26 1944

1061-62736-1905

on the lower left hand corner of the envelope to indicate that this operation has taken place. Another section of the Postal Censorship Station matches each envelope against the watch list to ascertain if the addressee is on the watch list and all of the mail thus handled receives a diagonal line in the lower left hand corner which may or may not cross the circular mark.

It is to be observed that all mail thus received at the Censorship Station receives the same marks regardless of whether or not the person is identified with the watch list and these marks are not taken off when passed to the addressee. Censorship feels that such marks being placed on innocent mail as well as suspicious mail would have no more effect on the recipients than the Censorship label which is affixed to all mail. They also strongly feel that the system of markings in the lower left hand corner on the face of the envelope is a necessary mechanical means of showing what has been done with each individual letter.

The only other marks which Censorship uses are small pencil dots placed on the back of the envelope of which the Bureau Laboratory is cognizant. These dots indicate to our own Laboratory the type of chemical tests which have been made on the letter. It is true that all letters passing through the Censorship Station are not subject to chemical tests and therefore some mail will be forwarded to the addressee without dots appearing on the back. Another classification of mail which does not receive these dots is the Special Watch List mail of the Bureau. This is so because Censorship by agreement does not test Special Watch List mail chemically. This operation is solely for the Bureau Laboratory. It is apparent, therefore, that even if persons on the Special Watch List were on the lookout for Censorship markings, they would detect a sticker, which is routine for any type of Censorship, and the crayon pencil markings on the lower left hand corner of the envelope. This should not arouse their suspicion since all mail carries the same symbols. A Special Watch List addressee would receive his letters with no pencilled dots on the back of the envelope due to the fact that Censorship does not chemically test this mail by Bureau agreement.

In summation, therefore, it may be stated that mail of interest to the Bureau is going to the addressee with Censorship labels and crayon markings on the lower left hand front and all mail passing through Censorship is getting the same treatment. If such is a risk, Censorship feels that it is a necessary one which cannot be changed feeling that in order to catch watch list mail the mechanics as worked out by them are the best possible under the circumstances because of the great volume which passes through their hands.

ACTION:

It is recommended, therefore, that no action be taken relative to the markings being used by Censorship since they appear to be uniform as to all mail passing through its hands with the exception that watch list mail is not receiving the chemical symbols used by Censorship because that agency is not conducting chemical analysis of this classification of mail.

CAA:REB

TO: MR. COFFEY
FROM: J. A. MARTIN
SUBJECT: CENSORSHIP

September 19, 1944

62-62736
80-604

Reference is made to previous memoranda concerning marks put on mail by the American Censorship intercepted by Censorship at the request of the Bureau. It will be recalled that this was started [redacted] so that it would be unnecessary to send with an intercept any separate statement as to the treatment by the Censorship Laboratory for invisible ink. The first advice of this is in a memorandum dated June 23, 1943, 62-62736-1682, which contains a copy of the letter of November 1942 instituting this system. Briefly, the capital letters were used with a pencil stroke along side which, when placed in the lower left corner of the letter for instance, would indicate major testing (complete invisible ink). The marks were supposed to be small so that they would not be noticeable. It will be recalled that in more than one instance there arose the serious question whether these marks, which were supposed to be erased at the last censorship station before going to the foreign countries, were not causing the watch list recipients to take action inimicable to the investigation. In one instance the drop immediately turned the letter over to the United States Ambassador, and there appears to be no other reason why he should take this action.

In a memorandum dated January 26, 1944 a new substitute system was outlined in which small lead pencil dots on the front and back of the envelope were be used to indicate the degree of testing. The existence of this system was disclosed when the Bureau sought to receive specific information as to tests for invisible ink being made by Censorship before turning over to the Bureau special and ordinary watch-list intercepts for testing by the Bureau's Laboratory. This is shown in 80-604-273

Notwithstanding the above, it has been observed for some time that marks consisting of a letter with a line have been appearing in blue pencil, in the same lower left-hand corner of the envelope of many of the watch list intercepts submitted to the Bureau by Censorship. From time to time these have been reported. In most instances these consist of the letter "O" with a line so that the marks may be a result of someone in the San Antonio station more than any other.

When the subject of the marks first arose, Censorship stated that they were not supposed to be put on intercepts made for the Bureau or other interested agencies, but only on those intercepted in general without special requests.

It is submitted that any system of marking the intercepts to indicate treatment of a certain kind can be readily detected by the enemy as well as the agencies of the United States [redacted] for work on the same is made. By simply noting the existence of marks on some mail and not on others it would be possible for the enemy to ascertain at least that the Allies have a special interest in those addresses. At the worst, of course, it would be possible by testing the letters received to work out the code meanings so as to discover not only the

b7D
62-62736-190
ORIGINAL COPY FILED

A-40

RECORDED

ENCLOSURE

86-604-307

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SEP 21 1944

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

b7D

t. 19, 1944

general interests but the kind of examination accorded these specimens through tests for the chemical used. However desirable it might be that the FBI invisible ink chemists [redacted] be informed of the tests made by the first b7D censorship station, it would seem that the possible loss of security, which has some evidence of being accomplished in the case referred to, could far exceed any such advantages, particularly since the passing along of the information could be accomplished without danger of loss by some other system, such as enclosing the letter in a marked cellophane envelope from which it would be taken before being forwarded.

RECOMMENDATION: (1) That the whole question be reconsidered and specifically that there be adopted a policy of placing no marks on the evidence which can in any way be interpreted as other than the usual indication which all mail receives when it passes through Censorship. In this connection in the use of numbers to indicate the censorship involved or other marks on the censorship stickers, there is always the danger of advising the enemy which routes are likely to be the least advantageous, those with the same number constantly being delayed and showing other signs of examination while those with different numbers are being passed through freely. This could be avoided without losing its advantages by some removal method such as tearing off the number before final distribution.

(2) That there be secured from Censorship information as to the present meaning of the marks of an "O" with a line. These marks are being found on Clog Case intercepts (not the dot letters secured in Mexico), in Case [redacted] letters from Argentina to New York and in other cases, in some of which statements have been made in the reports. b7E

(3) That there be secured from Censorship full information on all of the marks which they use on any stickers or other appurtenances which accompany intercepts, together with an agreement to advise the Bureau when new systems are adopted in the future. It will be noted that in both of the previous instances concerning marks put on the evidence the symbols were adopted some time before the Bureau was notified.

"The above has been prepared by Mr. Appel for consideration of the Security Division." JAM

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.
X-2 Branch

b6
b7c

CONFIDENTIAL

L2-1237-2

October 13, 1944

Memorandum for: Mr. C. Darwin Marron

Subject: Secret Writing

A German agent trained in S/W with a white-tipped match, with which method you are familiar, has given the following information concerning his experience in developing secret writing:

"He damped the surface of the side of the paper opposite to that on which the secret message was written, using a piece of wood with the end wrapped in cotton wool and dipped in a liquid with a faint chloric smell. Until the paper dried, this liquid left a slight yellow tinge on the paper. After this treatment the secret writing appeared in a bluish colour, and remained visible after the paper dried.

"It appeared that this method was not usually shown to trainees, and the agent in question assumed that his instructor gave him this demonstration only on account of the secret understanding between them. The instructor on this occasion commented that the English would never discover this method of developing.

"Later, in Paris, the agent in question witnessed the development of genuine letters from agents. These were fixed on special sensitised paper, which, unlike normal sensitised paper, did not turn black when exposed to light. The process which he had already watched was then employed, with one difference, namely that the liquid was applied to the side actually bearing the secret ink message. The writing again appeared in a bluish colour, remaining visible only as long as the paper was kept damp. It could, however, be renewed an indefinite number of times."

RECORDED & INDEXED

EX - 33

~~SECRET~~

80-604-308

F B I

31 OCT 26 1944

H. W. Peters

Horace W. Peters

X-2 Branch

56 OCT 31 1944

263

SI data checked in class. See 10-24-44 PEO

MM

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

MID 915

WAR DEPARTMENT
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON
- 25 -

WDGBI/WL
TWS/rec

[Handwritten signature]

September 29, 1944.

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:


Reference is made to your memorandum of August 8, 1944 addressed to the A. C. of S., G-2, Attention: Chief, Foreign Branch and requesting information concerning the characteristics and properties of certain pills stated to be used by German agents in the Middle East to create a special invisible ink.

There is inclosed herewith for your information a copy of a memorandum from the office of the Military Attache in Baghdad, Iraq, dated September 8, 1944 the third paragraph of which contains the data you requested.

Sincerely yours,

George D. Dorroh
GEORGE D. DORROH, *ADS*
Lieut. Colonel, (JAGD),
Chief, Security Liaison Section,
Washington Liaison Branch.

1 Incl.
Cpy of memo dated 9/8/44.



RECORDED
&
INDEXED
165
X-8

80-604-309
F. B. I.
14 OCT 26 1944
7-KK
80-604

~~SECRET~~

58 NOV 2 - 1944 363

Detection & Production of secret writing

14 11/9

ind. sp. pc

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
BAGHDAD, IRAQ.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

8 September 1944.

SUBJECT: Pills for Secret Writing.

TO : Chief, Military Intelligence Service, War Department,
Washington, D.C.

ATTN : Chief, Foreign Branch.

1. Reference is made to a request made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Source Control Number FBI-1) for information on pills for secret writing used by a German undercover organization in Iraq, first reported on in M/A Baghdad Report No. 152, dated 18 October 1943.

2. A check has been made through [REDACTED]

b7D

[REDACTED]
which originally furnished this information to the M/A. Although specimens of the pills are not available, this organization was able to furnish us [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

3. The pills were not as remarkable as the Germans claimed them to be, and GICX considers it likely that their properties were exaggerated in order to build up the morale of agents. The active matter in their composition was [REDACTED] which constituted 55% by weight of the mixture. The remaining ingredients were talc, 39%, boric acid, 4%, and indeterminate matter, 2% -- these latter substances being used to hold the pill together.

b3 Per CIA

b7D

*Index 5/1
10-3-44 ed*

P.H.M. Converse,
Colonel, Cavalry,
The Military Attache,

ARB/PAK.

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

80-674-309

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7c

35

THE OFFICE OF CENSORSHIP
TECHNICAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

Parsons

TOB/56
~~SECRET~~

September 30, 1944.

~~SECRET~~
TECHNICAL OPERATIONS BULLETIN NO. 56

BAUGHMAN
J. MARTIN

THE FOLLOWING IS RESTRICTED TO DPC's AND SSD PERSONNEL.

Approximately one year ago the Office of Censorship entered into a contract with the Office of Scientific Research and Development for the purpose of organizing a comprehensive research program to develop more and better methods for the detection of all types of physically concealed messages.

As many of you are not aware of the existence, scope and importance of this program, it is felt advisable to describe it to you.

In April, 1943, a representative of the Office of Censorship visited several outstanding laboratories of the Eastern United States in an effort to gain their assistance in the solution of certain pressing problems that were facing our laboratories. The biggest problem at that time (and it still is) was the development of a rapid and accurate method for the detection of "duffs". Many suggestions for the solution of this problem were offered, but later trials proved them all inadequate.

As a result of the preliminary contact with the various laboratories, one organization became definitely interested in our problems and offered its facilities to us. Several months were needed to coordinate them with our operations and to outline a broad program. When the preliminary work was finished, we were all rather astounded at the scope of the project and realized that if any immediate and applicable results were to be obtained additional collaborators would be required. As the budget of the Office of Censorship did not call for any research program of the scope we were undertaking, Mr. Price presented our problem to Dr. Vannevar Bush of the Office of Scientific Research & Development. Dr. Bush realized immediately the importance of our problems and though his staff serves principally the Army and Navy, he was willing and anxious to place the facilities of his organization at our disposal.

INDEXED

80-604-310
RECORDED

- 1 -

~~SECRET~~

53 NOV 26 1944

The pace of the program was accelerated immediately and the total program broken down into projects which were assigned to no less than six outstanding laboratories throughout the country. (See footnote). As a result, the Office of Censorship now has available for consultation and work some of the best scientific minds in the United States.

Over and above several specialized problems of detection, the general program was beamed toward the development of more comprehensive reagents and techniques, which could be incorporated into a scheme for mass production. The approach to the problem is best typified by quoting an excerpt from a progress report of one of the contributing laboratories:

"In the development of a comprehensive system of techniques for S.W. detection, it is manifestly unsound to confine the methods to those writing agents already encountered. Adequate coverage can be attained only if the methods are based on the assumption that the enemy agent may use any substance which affords him reasonable security and for which means of development exist. Hence the number of materials that have to be considered in a program of studies is exceedingly large - prohibitively large, in fact, for the short time available.

"Such an outlook, therefore, would indicate need for a survey of S.W. possibilities with an attempt to classify the vast number of substances. Various groupings are of course possible, but those based on common chemical or physical properties which might be made the basis of detection methods would appear to be the most useful."

As the basis for the program, a chart setting forth the various classes of compounds was prepared. From each group was chosen one or two representative compounds which would demonstrate the most characteristic reaction of each group. These compounds were then used as a basis for the preparation of standard screeds. The development of a suitable method for the preparation of standard screeds presented many problems but these problems have been overcome by the construction of a special machine and reproducible screeds can be printed at the rate of one every six seconds. It is now possible to test any new reagents or techniques under standard and reproducible conditions.

Some of the more specific problems that have been assigned to the various laboratories are as follows:

- (1) Perfection of present tests
- (2) Study of gaseous reagents
- (3) Effect of various wavelengths of light
- (4) Factors influencing bath process

~~SECRET~~

- (5) Comprehensive study of heat as a developer
- (6) Photographic techniques
- (7) Detection of duffs by:
 - (a) Soft X-Rays
 - (b) Cyclotron bombardment
 - (c) Various types of transmitted light
 - (d) Amalgamation with mercury and subsequent detection of mercury
- (8) Study of natural dyes
- (9) Study of synthetic dyes

Results of the program to date have been both encouraging and disappointing. The disappointments in no way reflect a lack of effort or ingenuity on the part of the investigators but rather the tremendous complexity of the entire problem. Many helpful suggestions have been forthcoming and many more are still in the developmental stage.

Our biggest disappointment was in the failure to discover any rapid foolproof method for the detection of "duffs". Our present technique of caniling and mass steaming still remains unchallenged.

In view of the facilities and excellent scientific minds that are available to us, coupled with the extensive and indispensable contributions it is felt that we can take courage from the knowledge b7D that our present techniques and methods are far from second rate and undoubtedly the best available in any organization - the enemy included.

(Note: We wish to emphasize the security precautions attendant to the subcontracting of the various projects. All laboratories involved are under oath and the personnel to whom secret information is available are severely restricted in number and have been thoroughly investigated.)

~~SECRET~~

TOB/56

~~SECRET~~

THE FOLLOWING IS FOR THE INFORMATION OF ALL SSD PERSONNEL.

With increased demands for detailed production reports from the field stations, we feel that you frequently ask yourselves - "Why?" You undoubtedly wonder if such demands are unmistakable signs that our organization is developing "bureaucratic symptoms".

Due to the controversial nature of this question, it behooves us not to take sides. However, we do feel that an explanation as to what use is made of these reports will be valuable to you.

As you may know, the President has instructed the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to prepare for the demobilization of all War agencies. It is not expected that demobilization, in the case of Censorship, will be a sudden cessation of activities but rather a progressive diminution of operations, with all phases of our work coming under greater and constant scrutiny.

As Security is the basic concept upon which Censorship is founded, it is logical that those operations dealing with security will be the last ones demobilized. Even so, any non-productive functions of the security program will of necessity be curtailed or eliminated entirely. It is necessary, therefore, that we have available complete, accurate and current data on the operations of all field station Special Security Departments so that we can accurately determine which functions can be eliminated or curtailed and which functions must be maintained or emphasized until the enemy is completely defeated.

Past reports have been indispensable to our calculations of total SSD strength for the fiscal year 1945 as well as for justification of our current drive in the S/I laboratories.

The two revised reports, OC-512 and OC-513, which you will receive soon bear certain additional categories that will give us a better picture of your operations and enable us to make an accurate estimate of budgetary requirements for all stations when the need arises. The reports also will enable you to present a more complete picture of your total effort.

It is our earnest desire that you give us your full cooperation in preparing a complete and accurate report so we may dispatch our obligation of presenting, upon request, an accurate and documented statement of the current condition and future requirements of the Special Security Departments.

- 4 -

~~SECRET~~

TOB/56

~~SECRET~~

THE FOLLOWING IS RESTRICTED TO SSD PERSONNEL.

Relative to airmailed submissions prepared on names watch-listed in accordance with PC Letters Nos. 396 and 397, and Censorship Memoranda Nos. 224 and 225, it has been brought to the attention of TOD that instructions contained in paragraphs 6 and 8, page 6 of the Special Security Manual have been overlooked in some instances. All Special Security Assistants are requested to caution all concerned to ascertain that these instructions are understood.

In connection with names listed under PC Letter No. 397 and Censorship Memorandum No. 224, kindly check to see that two copies of postal submissions, telephone transcripts, or cable copies are being airmailed to distant stations.

- 5 -
~~SECRET~~

CAA:RMB
80-604

Date: November 3, 1944

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~
VIA DIPLOMATIC COURIER

To: Mr. Francis E. Crosby
Legal Attache
The American Embassy
Buenos Aires, Argentine

From: J. Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: Writing Material Standards

With a letter of May 2, 1944 you forwarded for the Laboratory one of the "Franklin" pens as a standard for comparison with questioned writings. The Laboratory was very eager to receive this, having heard some references to articles of this kind. It is now desired to secure a number of additional "Franklin" pens for further experiments. It would also be desirable to ascertain whatever information is available concerning the ink used, how the pen is re-filled and any other information of a similar kind which will shorten the steps necessary in order to devise methods of testing, which will reveal the presence of such inks on questioned documents or the use of such a pen. If you can ascertain the patent number, provided a copy would be available in the United States Patent Office, this would assist considerably, since a reference to the patent claims will enable information regarding the means used, such as a mixture of aniline dye and glucose as you state.

Please also advise if this is the so-called "Strato-pen" which, it is understood, is made in Argentina, its specific purpose being to avoid the effects of low air pressure at high altitudes in airplanes. If there are any other writing materials which are not generally encountered in the United States, please secure samples and forward them that they may be used as

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 8
NOV 9 1944 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
78 NOV 20 1944

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

EX-35
80-604-31
27 NOV 1944

EPK

Emm

10 PM '44

~~SECRET~~ (U)
THE OFFICE OF CENSORSHIP
WASHINGTON

b6
b7c

November 14, 1944.

Mr. John Edgar Hoover,
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Attention: Mr. W. J. Powell.

I enclose for your information a copy of a Security
Memorandum dated November 11, 1944, subject; Discovery of Secret
Writing on Envelope.

Please sign and return the enclosed duplicate copy of
this letter in acknowledgment of receipt.

EX-8

Sincerely yours,
J. P. Wagemuth
J. P. Wagemuth,
Executive Liaison Officer.

Enclosure:
As above.

~~SECRET~~ (U)

56 NOV 25 1944

RECORDED

&
INDEXED

180-604-312
20 NOV 18 1944

~~SECRET~~

TECHNICAL OPERATIONS DIVISION
ANALYTIC SECTION

Security Memorandum

November 11, 1944.

Subject: Discovery of Secret Writing on Envelope.

1. The case discussed in this Memorandum is a particularly delicate one under active investigation. With specific exceptions the material contained herein is restricted to the DFC, the SSA and the Chemist and should not be disseminated to or discussed with other Censorship personnel or the representatives of other agencies. In paragraph 4 there is a list of significant physical characteristics and in paragraph 11 a list of significant mail criteria which are valueless unless put to practical use by censorship examiners and sorters. These two lists constitute the two exceptions mentioned above and they may be disseminated exactly as they appear without reference to any other portions of the Memorandum. If it is desired to show examiners and sorters a photograph of the physical set-up of the envelope, a dummy copy should be prepared with fictitious names and addresses.

2. In T.O. Bulletin #61 attention was drawn to the possibility of the use of secret writing on the outside of envelopes underneath the top flap, when the envelope is sealed. This information was based on a very recent intercept from Augusto Navega, Rua S. Roque da Lameira 1061, Porto, Portugal (***) Gx 7700) to John Gold, P. O. Box 720, New York City (***) Bx 7700), which was found to contain secret writing in the position described in the T.O. Bulletin. Photographs are attached showing the envelope when sealed, as well as after being opened.

3. It will be noted that the envelope has a very deep overlap which allows sufficient space for a message. There is a slight possibility that the envelope has been specially constructed with this purpose in view, but this type of envelope is not uncommon in better-grade stationery and for greeting cards.

4. The envelope has the following physical characteristics:

- a. Large size - $4\frac{1}{2}$ " x $6\frac{3}{8}$ "
- b. The paper used for both cover and letter is a good quality bond paper.
- c. The envelope has a particularly deep overlap, $\frac{3}{4}$ " at the side and $1\frac{1}{2}$ " at the center.
- d. The name of the addressee has a space between each letter.
- e. The two lines of the address are inset six spaces and are evenly aligned one under the other.

- 1 -

80-604-312

~~SECRET~~

SPECIAL NOTICE—This contains information taken from private communications, and its extremely confidential character must be preserved. The information must be confined only to those officials whose knowledge of it is necessary to prosecution of the war. In no case should it be widely distributed, or copies made, or the information used in legal proceedings or in any other public way without express consent of the Director of Censorship.

BYRON PRICE, Director

~~SECRET~~

- f. NEW-YORK-CITY has been hyphenated.
- g. No country is shown.
- h. Sender's name and address appear on the back in three separate lines and are inset.

5. The ink used had a dull appearance by reflected ordinary light at a sharp angle of incidence and had slight fluorescence under U.V. A person with very keen eyesight might possibly see the S/W. It is thought that the ink may be [redacted] The ink was to be developed by application of a hot iron which would turn it brown. The flap of the envelope had not been well glued and it opened very easily. It was probably believed that excess glueing might damage the ink, although it is considered possible that the glue might serve as a protection rather than a hindrance. Communications suspected of containing S/W in this position on the envelope should be opened dry, since steaming might reduce the opportunity for detection and development.

b3 Per CIA
b7E

6. Transcription of the S/W:

BRIEF v. 8.12. u. TELEGRAM v. 15.4. ERST JETZT ERHALTEN. VERZOGERT, WEIL FALSCHES DECKADRESSE BENUTZT. EMPFEHLEN DRINGEND BENUTZUNG DER VON UNS GEGEBENEN ADRESSEN. ABSENDEN BLINDSPRUCHE. NACH ERSTEM EMPFANG ERBITTEN TELEGRAMM. "SAMPLES RECEIVED." SIND SEHR BENUTZT UM GELD UBERWEISUNG, JEDOCH NUR WENN GEFahrLOS - ENDE -

Translation of the S/W:

Letter of December 8 and telegram of April 4 only received now. Delayed because wrong cover address used. We urgently recommend use of the addresses given by us. We are sending "BLINDSPRUCHE" (? blind messages?). After first receipt we request telegram: "Samples received". We are making great efforts in regard to remittance of money, but only if without danger. - End -

7. The reference to the wrong cover address being used may refer to the fact that the sender's name is listed as Antonio/Goncalves/Navega and not Augusto Navega as shown on the present letter. A previous parallel instance of the importance of the use by agents of the exact cover addresses given them is furnished in the Duff Case. (BER/22685/42) In December 1941, the principals in Germany wrote: "The addresses must be written exactly as given to you, as otherwise the mail passes through Censorship here and only reaches us after examination by the Gestapo, etc., as suspicious, if it reaches us at all. This only refers to actual names." It will be noted that in the present instance the difference is in the name and not the address of addressee.

SPECIAL NOTICE—This contains information taken from private communications, and its extremely confidential character must be preserved. The information must be confined only to those officials whose knowledge of it is necessary to prosecution of the war. In no case should it be widely distributed, or copies made, or the information used in legal proceedings or in any other public way without express consent of the Director of Censorship.

BYRON PRICE, Director

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

8. The cover letter conforms to the usual characteristics of S/W communications. It is written on one side of the paper only with a well-spaced lay-out. The text also is vague, referring to an unspecified business and mentions receipt of a sign of life.

9. Translation of cover letter:

"Oporto, 8th August 1944

Dear Friend John

I am very glad to have received your sign of life and to see that you are studying the possibilities of fulfilling our mutual desires after the war. So then I should be glad if you would keep me up-to-date in regard to the experiences made there (U.S.A.). It is superfluous to say that I, on my part, am always ready to give you assistance, obtaining any information that may be necessary for you to be able to make your arrangements.

In case of necessity, I shall also have much pleasure in going to see the competitor firms here, so that they can send you samples.

In any case I await your further news. I sincerely wish that the time is not far off when we can do good business.

Cordial greetings,

/s/ Augusto"

10. Particular attention is drawn to the very considerable interval between the date of the letter, August 8, and that of the postmark, Sept. 27. Among westbound S/W letters detected in the past it has been noted that quite a number have been on heavy bond paper in large envelopes of a size approximately the same as that used for the subject letter. Further analysis has shown that these letters on good quality paper have a noticeable discrepancy between the letter and postmark dates. This has led to the conclusion that the letters of this type are prepared in Germany itself and are sent to neutral countries for mailing. While it is expected that the number of westbound S/W letters intercepted by Censorship will naturally be fewer than the number of eastbound communications, it is known that positive communications in westbound channels have passed through Censorship without being detected.

11. In view of the foregoing comments it is felt that special attention should be given to letters which have all the following features:

- a. Westbound mail, postmarked in a neutral European country.
- b. Good quality heavy paper.
- c. Large envelopes with a deep overlap of the back flap.
- d. Discrepancy of five days or more between date of letter and date of postmark.
- e. Letter of vague text written on one side of the paper only.

~~SECRET~~

SPECIAL NOTICE—This contains information taken from private communications, and its extremely confidential character must be preserved. The information must be confined only to those officials whose knowledge of it is necessary to prosecution of the war. In no case should it be widely distributed, or copies made, or the information used in legal proceedings or in any other public way without express consent of the Director of Censorship.
BYRON PRICE, Director

~~SECRET~~

12. It is recommended that instructions be issued to examiners and sorters to be on the alert for this type of communication. It must be borne in mind that a notable discrepancy between letter and postmark dates on westbound letters is sufficient reason at any time to suspect that they have originated in enemy territory. Duffs have been found on airmail type envelopes showing a marked difference between the two dates. However, it is felt that the indications given above should serve as criteria for suspecting S/W.

~~SECRET~~

SPECIAL NOTICE—This contains information taken from private communications, and its extremely confidential character must be preserved. The information must be confined only to those officials whose knowledge of it is necessary to prosecution of the war. In no case should it be widely distributed, or copies made, or the information used in legal proceedings or in any other public way without express consent of the Director of Censorship.

BYRON PRICE, Director

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

EPC:AF - File 80-604

TO : MR. BAUGHMAN 125

DATE: 10/9/44

FROM : E. P. COFFEY

SUBJECT: Detection of [REDACTED]

Dr. Pierce of Censorship stopped by my office this afternoon and left the attached research paper prepared in Censorship entitled "Detection of [REDACTED]". He stated he brought this over after receiving from the FBI the recent blind memorandum which described the use of [REDACTED] by the Germans. He said he wanted to let us know that Censorship had a lot of good technical information on [REDACTED] so that we would have it in our file. He called attention to the extreme sensitivity of their developer.

I thanked him for furnishing these technical data and told him our S/W chemist would go over them carefully and if we had any information in our Laboratory which would tend to supplement, we would send him over a memorandum so supplementing.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
b3 Per CIA
b7E Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Jones
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

TO Detection and production of Secret History

50 NOV 27 1944

RECORDED
&
INDEXED
154

EX-37

80-604-36
NOV 23 1944

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

RHC:ABC

80-604

TO :

E. P. Coffey

DATE: 11/11/44

FROM :

T. F. Baughman

SUBJECT:

Re: Procurement of Secret Ink Materials For SIS.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Jones
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

Recently we have experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining powder in metal cans for SIS secret ink use. Some of the men have furnished talcum they have purchased in the Field bearing labeling in the native language. This talcum has been brought to the laboratory [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

It is suggested that it would be to our advantage to ask SIS to obtain a quantity of several assorted [redacted] available in the Field to be forwarded to the laboratory for supplying to future trainees.

b3 Per CIA
b7E

Secret Ink
RHC Letter to O'head
11/21/44
gwh

h
h

80-604-
NOT RECORDED
NOV 28 1944

rs
GWH:mgr

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COURIER

DATE: November 21, 1944

TO: Mr. Birch D. O'Neal
The American Embassy
Mexico, D. F.

FROM: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Supplies

Secret Writing

It is desired that you procure and forward to the Bureau approximately one dozen packages of assorted manufactured in your country or other countries in Latin America. Other offices to whom copies of this letter are directed should do likewise.

b3 Per CIA
b7E

After the contents of this letter have been noted, it should be destroyed.

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Jones _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

cc: Mr. William S. Crawford
The American Embassy
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
Mr. Donald B. Clegg
The American Embassy
Bogota, Colombia

NOV 24 1944 P.M.

Mr. Charles E. McNabb
The American Embassy
Lima, Peru

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

80-604
NOT RECORDED
NOV 28 1944
424
NOV 23 5 23 PM '44
RECEIVED READING ROOM
NOV 28 1944

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

EPC:AF

DATE: 11/23/44

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM : THE EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE

SUBJECT:

The Conference on November 22, 1944, consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Gurnea, Rosen, Ladd, Clegg, Acers, Hince, Tracy, and Coffey, considered the secret ink multiple testing machine which was designed and invented in the Laboratory by examiner J. W. Magee. The Conference was of the opinion that if it is possible a "Government use" patent should be obtained for this machine and the patent should be obtained under such confidential provisions as are set up in the Patent Office for so doing. The Conference further was of the opinion that after this patent application has been filed and is of record the Censorship officials should be invited to view the machine. If you concur a memorandum for the Assistant Attorney General has been prepared requesting him to initiate the patent proceedings.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

✓
Clyde Tolson, Chairman

W. R. Glavin, Secretary

cc-Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg

Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. E. A. Tamm ✓
Mr. Clegg ✓
Mr. Coffey ✓
Mr. Glavin ✓
Mr. Ladd ✓
Mr. Nichols ✓
Mr. Rosen ✓
Mr. Tracy ✓
Mr. Mohr ✓
Mr. Carson ✓
Mr. Hendon ✓
Mr. Mumford ✓
Mr. Jones ✓
Mr. Quinn Tamm ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Mr. Nease ✓
Miss Beahm ✓
Miss Gandy ✓

180-604-315

RECORDED

DEC 1 1944

TWO

RHC:JAWK

November 30, 1944

cc: 80-604 ✓

MR. COFFEY

Re: Censorship Contacts;
Monthly Report.

The following contacts were had between Laboratory employees of Censorship and ourselves during the past month.

On November 3 Messrs. Baughman and Magee visited the U. S. Censorship Laboratory to discuss Censorship's new policy of exhaustive tests on all mail in certain channels. Censorship's new hand applicator, also secret ink development with [redacted] indelible pencil secret writing development with a new paper and some phases of the Goldschmidt letter which had secret writing under the envelope flap. b3 Per CIA b7E

On November 10, 1944 Mr. Philip Wolgemuth of the U. S. Censorship was in Mr. Cunningham's office and Mr. Chambers went down to furnish him with details of the Goldschmidt letter referred to above, at the request of the Security Division Supervisor.

On November 23, 1944 Dr. Pierce from U. S. Censorship's laboratory came over to discuss technical phases of the micro dots.

Respectfully,

T. F. Baughman

RECORDED

EX-75

50 DEC 31 1944

80-604-316
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DEC 14 1944
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
INITIALS ON ORIGINAL - 13

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-63000

*1, reviewed by, and
Return to Mr. Baughman if re
synthetic inks and so forth.*



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

November 17, 1944

JWM:ABC:MR

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Piper _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Beahm _____
Miss Gandy _____

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. COFFEY

Re: ~~Secret Ink Testing of Mail~~
Received from Censorship

Reference is made to my memorandum dated November 10, 1944, concerning Censorship's new policy of allowing stripes to remain on all documents in certain channels. As illustrated in that memorandum it now becomes very important for each Bureau Supervisor to specifically state his wishes concerning condition, with respect to appearance, of the letter when it is delivered to the addressee.

To facilitate the handling of this matter by the Bureau Supervisors and to facilitate and expedite the work of the secret ink unit, it is suggested that a supply of the attached form be printed for distribution to the Bureau Supervisors. It is further suggested that you might wish to bring to the attention of Messrs. Ladd and Powell the existence of these printed forms and suggest that Powell attach one of the printed forms to each letter which he routes to the Bureau Supervisors. The Bureau Supervisor should check the type of examination he desires and route the letter to Miss Mills in Room 7619.

At the present time the Supervisors send the letters, usually to Mr. Martin or the document examiner, by routing slip. The Supervisor may or may not specify on the routing slip the type of examination desired. After proper notations are made on these routing slips by the recorders, the slips are placed in the Laboratory correspondence folders.

Under the new setup the Supervisors should continue to send the letters to the Laboratory by routing slip, plus one of the new forms indicating the examinations he desires. After recording, the routing slip should then be filed, as is being done at present. The recorder should place the file number and the document or PC number on the new form and this form should remain with the evidence in order that the secret ink examiners might know what kind of testing is desired on each letter by the Supervisor of the case. When the report is dictated, the new form could be attached to the number one examiner's work sheet and filed.

It is recommended that you suggest to Mr. Ladd that the Supervisors make the greatest possible use of category number five on the attached form. As you can see, this will enable the secret ink unit to test for inks such as _____

b3 Per CIA
b7E



If this new procedure is approved I will have a supply of these forms printed and sent to Powell.

Respectfully,

T. F. Baughman

32 DEC 12 1944
The above has been printed
1/14/45
JWM

6 1 DEC 19 1944 80-604

Form removed & sent to Mech. Section 11/29/44 JWM

24

MR. LADD

November 21, 1944

C. H. Carson

Emergency Informants in Argentina
Argentina - Administrative~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reference is made to previous memoranda concerning the above-mentioned subject, more particularly my memorandum dated October 31, 1944 entitled, "Plans for SIS Coverage in Argentina," in which there were outlined the various plans for SIS coverage in Argentina in any eventuality. It will be remembered that it was suggested that secret writing material be made available to the Argentina office so that they might be furnished two informants for use in communications should this country either sever relations with Argentina or war be declared between the two countries.

DETAILS

Special Agent J. P. Joice, who is going to Buenos Aires as Legal Attache, has obtained training in secret ink writing in the Laboratory from R. H. Chambers. He has obtained training in the use of five secret writing materials and has also learned the method of developing these secret inks should it ever be necessary to receive secret ink communications in Montevideo, Santiago or Lima where it would be necessary to develop them. The five methods are as follows:

- (1) [redacted] This chemical is found in a patent medicine manu- b3 Per CIA
factured by [redacted] laboratories in Buenos Aires and marketed under the tra b7E
name of [redacted] which is claimed to be a cure for rheumatism. The
tablets each weigh one gram and are coated. The procedure is to dissolve
one-quarter gram or $\frac{1}{4}$ of a tablet in three ounces of alcohol. Before the
pill is dissolved in the alcohol, care should be taken to remove the
coating which is a red dye and sugar solution. For the alcohol a 90 to
100 proof gin may be used. The stylus for applying the secret ink is a
tooth pick with a cotton swab on the end. The best type of stylus is one
which is not too thick but at the same time is padded well enough with the
cotton wool so that the sharp end of the tooth pick does not protrude and
leave a mark on the paper. After the secret message has been written, the
paper should be immersed in the same liquid which was used as the solvent
for the tablet in the preparation of the ink. The paper is then dried,
and it was found that for this purpose a telephone book produced satis-
factory results through frequently moving the wet paper from one section
of the book to the other until dried. The vast bulk of the liquid used
in the bath and still clinging to the paper can be removed by placing it
on a blotter before placing the paper between the leaves of the telephone
book. Care should be used in this drying method so that the paper might
be restored as near as possible to its original form for the purpose of
avoiding detection.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Jones
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

The developer used for this type of secret ink is a two per cent [redacted] 13 1944
which is applied on the paper by the use of [redacted] b3 Per CIA
b7E

b7E

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

EX-79 131
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION80-604-318
13 1944U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
b3 Per CIA
b7E

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADD

a cotton swab. [] might easily be obtained at any photograph store in Latin America. b3 Per CIA
b7E

This secret ink is visible under a high-pressure ultra-violet light which is created by mercury and argon vapor. This type of light is the same type that is furnished Bureau Field Offices in a portable machine. The secret ink is not visible, however, under a low pressure mercury vapor ultra-violet light.

This method of secret ink writing has already been furnished the Buenos Aires Office in a recent radiogram.

(2) [] This secret ink may be prepared from a Park-Davis product called [] which is obtainable in drug stores in Buenos Aires and is advertised as a salve for burns. The ink is prepared by dissolving one drop of the material in approximately one ounce of 90 to 100 proof alcohol or gin. After the material has been dissolved in the gin, the fatty substance remaining undissolved in the solution may be filtered out by pouring the liquid through a piece of gauze. b3 Per CIA
b7E

The ink is then applied as in the previous method with a stylus made of a tooth pick and cotton swab and the paper is given the same type of bath and drying procedure as noted in the first method.

The developer for this method is made by placing on a cotton swab a few drops each of a two per cent solution of [] and a three per cent solution of []. Both these latter substances may be obtained in photographic stores as photographic materials. b3 Per CIA
b7E

(3) [] The ink to be used in this method is manufactured by dissolving approximately [] in one ounce of water to create a saturated solution which will appear cloudy. This liquid may then be filtered through a piece of gauze and diluted with an equal part of gin or alcohol to produce the writing material. The ink is then applied as in previous methods with a tooth pick stylus which has been padded with absorbent cotton. Care should be used in this method to have the stylus generously moistened through frequent dippings in the ink, although caution should be used so that too large amounts of the ink are not applied to the paper. In this method also the paper should be subjected to a bath of gin and dried as previously. The ink is developed in this method by scorching the paper with a hot iron.

(4) [] This material is available in Buenos Aires and is sold by druggists on the open market as a material used to lower blood pressure. The ink is prepared by dissolving .2 gram pill in one ounce of 90 to 100 proof gin or alcohol. If the pills are coated, care should be used to remove this coating before emersion in the liquid. Pills should be used as a source for this material and not the elixir. In order to obtain clear solution, the liquid can be filtered through a piece of gauze. b3 Per CIA
b7E

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADD

The ink is applied with a tooth pick stylus as in previous methods and the paper is subjected to a gin bath also as previously.

The developer for this ink is a two per cent solution of [redacted] b3 Per CIA [redacted] with one or two drops of a five per cent solution of hydrochloric acid should the [redacted] fail to bring the ink up by itself. The developer is applied by means of a cotton swab as in the previous methods. b7E

(5) Water Method. In using this method, a high grade piece of paper is soaked for fifteen or twenty minutes in clear water and is then placed on a piece of glass or extremely hard surface such as slate. A dry piece of paper of the same texture as the soaked paper is then placed on top and the secret message is then placed on the wet paper by writing it with a soft pencil on the top dry sheet. Care should be used in the selection of this paper in that it should be a good quality and should not be hotel stationery or any other type of paper which might be used for comparison purposes. This precaution should be taken so that an outside observer can not compare the papers and discern that one of them has been soaked in water.

The secret message is visible on the paper until it is dried. During the drying process care should be taken to blot the paper so that it does not dry in a wrinkled form and indicate thereby that it has been soaked.

The secret message is developed by again wetting the paper and the message is visible when the paper is in this state.

In all of the five above methods, it was found that a good grade heavy paper was best suited for all methods except [redacted] and it was apparent the b3 Per CIA this paper scorched more satisfactorily in the developing process than did [redacted] b7E other. In all methods it was found preferable to print the secret message for clarity and care need be taken so that an adequate but not too generous supply of the secret ink material is applied to the paper to create the secret ink writing. In all methods, it is also desirable that the same material is used as a bath that has been used as a solvent for the preparation of the ink, whether it be alcohol or gin. In all methods informants will be instructed to apply the secret ink on the reverse side of the paper from the en clair portion of the message and they will also be instructed to apply the secret ink writing at right angles to the visible message. They will also be cautioned not to use double spaced writing for the purpose of interlining the secret ink message in the available open spaces.

ACTION

These secret ink methods were furnished to Agent Joice for use in an emergency and will not be given by him to Argentine informants unless that emergency arises. For security purposes, he has written in telegraphic form instructions for the use of each method. These instructions have been enciphered in Joice's personal X code and will be sent to him in Buenos Aires upon arrival through the diplomatic pouch. For security purposes they will be kept in the safe in the Buenos Aires office and will be deciphered by him only if it is necessary to make use of these secret inks in an emergency.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

RHC:AWK 80-604

TO : MR. E. P. COFFEY

DATE: December 6, 1944

FROM : T. F. BAUGHMAN TFB

SUBJECT: Emergency Informants in Argentina; Argentina - Administrative.

Reference is made to Mr. Carson's memorandum for Mr. Ladd dated November 24, 1944 setting forth in detail the five secret ink methods imparted to Special Agent J. P. Joice. As requested by SIS, the secret inks given Agent Joice were of such a type that they could be used in two-way communications independent of the laboratory if the situation should so demand. Because more simple developer procedures were desired, it was necessary to devise two additional methods not previously the subject of the previous memoranda concerning the referenced subject. These methods are the [redacted] and b3 Per CIA water methods. b7E

Agent Joice prepared brief instructions for the use of these five methods in telegraphic form to be enciphered in his personal X Code and forwarded to the Buenos Aires office by Diplomatic Pouch, to be placed in the office safe until such time as they have need for these secret inks. Mr. Chambers has reviewed the reference memorandum and brief instructions and found their contents satisfactory.

It is noted that Special Agent Joice had an excellent understanding of the principles and background necessary for the operation of this type of writing method, and that he was vitally interested in the techniques and methods employed in order to secure optimum results.

The five methods furnished to Agent Joice are as follows:

[redacted]

b3 Per CIA
b7E

5. Water Method, developed with water.

A copy of this memorandum should be placed in the secret ink file, 80-604, together with copies of the reference memorandum and telegraphic instructions, which are attached hereto.

RECORDED

180-604-319
F B I

EX-19 32 DEC 14 1944

51 DEC 19 1944

Paris, France
Nov. 13, 1944

Attention: SIS European Desk

Communication #82
Via Army Rouch

~~DATE: 8-20-2027~~
~~CLASSIFIED BY: 201063 ELW/BCE/DC~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3(6) 8-20-2027~~

RE: ~~Secret Inks Employed by the~~
~~Germans in France~~ (S) (U)

All para. were referred to originating Government, Information remains classif.
Per Letter dated 4-2-2004.

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

Dear Sir:

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED~~
~~HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT~~
~~WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

The following is a translation of a memorandum prepared for me by [REDACTED] on various secret ink processes known to have been used by German Agents in France and her colonies. A perusal of this information by the writer indicates to him that there is nothing very new here, although the processes may differ slightly from that which is already known to the FBI laboratory in certain cases. (S) (U)

b7D
b7E

" VARIOUS WRITING METHODS USING SYMPATHETIC INKS USED BY AGENTS OF THE GERMAN SECRET SERVICE IN FRANCE (S) (U)

1. ~~THE PHILLIPS PROCESS~~ (S) (U)

In this process a plastic paste made of a mixture of wax and either white pitch or Burgundy pitch is used. This plastic is softened by the rolling it between the fingers and is then put on the end of a toothpick. (S) (U)

b3 Per CIA

[REDACTED] The writing should be in capital letters and b7E should be careful to use an even pressure. (S) (U)

To develop this writing slightly heated powdered charcoal should be used. This powder will stick to the wax left on the paper by the writing. (S) (U)

2. ~~Process used by some of WYLAND'S Agents~~ (S) (U)

The ink used should be made of a pyramiden tablet dissolved in alcohol. The ink can be developed with a solution of water and common soda. (S) (U)

3. The ink here is made of a spoonfull of alcohol and 10-12 drops of lemon juice. The pen to use is a pointed stick with a little cotton batting on the tip. (S) (U)

To develop this ink a pinch of sodium sulfate dissolved in a table-spoonful of water should be made into solution and rubbed over the papers with a cotton swab. The writing will come out dark blue. (S) (U)

4. Powdered [REDACTED] dissolved in water. Here again the pen should b3 Per CIA batting on the end of a pointed stick and the writing should be in capit b7E When the writing is dry [REDACTED] The writing will be developed by the use of heat. (S) (U)

When further information of this nature is made available to the writers, the Bureau will be promptly advised. (S) (U)

Very truly yours,

/S/ Frederick Ayer Jr.

Letter to Ayer at Paris

DVH-1/10/45-100

52 JAN 17 1945 C 321

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

DVH:FJS

[REDACTED]

80-604-321

RECORDED

Date: January 10, 1945

EX - 6

To: Special Agent Frederick Ayer, Jr.

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: Secret Inks Employed by the Germans in France

b7E

Reference is made to your communication #82 dated November 13, 1944, the above-entitled matter. Your letter was referred to the Bureau Laboratory the following comments have been made on the processes you mentioned:

1. The Phillips Process.

This process is detailed as one involving a mixture of wax and some sort of pitch, whereas the only case known to the Bureau where the code name Phillip is used is the Goldschmidt case, wherein the active ingredient is not pitch but [REDACTED]. A practical identical process attributable to the Italian S.R.A. is reported in a memorandum for Mr. Wesley Reynolds from MIS dated February 13, 1944, a copy of which appears in file 80-604. The technical character of the information is such as to indicate that which is described herein and the material from the S.R.A. is from the same source.

b3 Per CIA
b7E

2. Process used by some of Wyland's Agents.

This alludes to the development of a pyramidon ink by the use of common soda. Such confusion has been observed a number of times in connection with German agents furnished pyramidon as an ink but to whom secret writing letters would be directed that are prepared from [REDACTED] which latter is developed by soda. Pyramidon is not developed by soda.

b3 Per CIA
b7E

3. The idea of developing lemon juice secret ink with sodium sulphate is entirely erroneous. Writing will not develop, nor will it come out dark blue.

This description of the use of powdered [REDACTED] dissolved in water appears to be the only one which is in any way accurate. It represents a crude method.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

The above comments are being furnished as of possible assistance in evaluating the source of information referred to in the reference letter.

DELIVERED BY

JAN 10 1945

MESSENGER - SIS

JAN 19 1945

Room 2242

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

RHC:AWK 80-604

TO : E. P. COFFEY

DATE: 12/5/44

FROM : T. F. BAUGHMAN

SUBJECT: Secret Inks Employed by the Germans in France.

Reference is made to Frederick Ayer, Junior's communication #82 setting forth four German secret ink processes reported to be used by them in France and her colonies.

The following things are to be observed regarding the authenticity and source of each of the four processes.

1. The ~~Phillips~~ Process.

This process is detailed as one involving a mixture of wax and some sort of pitch, whereas the only case known to the Bureau where the code name ~~Phillip~~ is used is the Goldschmidt case, wherein the active ingredient is not pitch but [redacted]. A practical identical process attributable to the Italian S.R.A. is reported in a memorandum for Mr. Wesley Reynolds from MIS dated February 13, 1944, a copy of which appears in file 80-604. The technical character of the information is such as to indicate that which is described herein and the material from the S.R.A. is from the same source.

2. Process used by some of ~~Wyland's~~ Agents.

This alludes to the development of a pyramidon ink by the use of common soda. Such confusion has been observed a number of times in connection with German agents furnished pyramidon as an ink but to whom secret writing letters would be directed that are prepared [redacted] which latter is developed by soda. Pyramidon is not developed by soda. b3 Per CIA b7E

3. The idea of developing lemon juice secret ink with sodium sulphate is entirely erroneous. Writing will not develop, nor will it come out dark blue.

4. This description of the use of powdered [redacted] dissolved in water appears to be the only one which is in any way accurate. It represents a crude method.

The above comments are being furnished as of possible assistance in evaluating the source of information referred to in the reference letter.

Letter to Ayer at Paris
DUH- 1/10/45

80-604-321

RECORDED

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Coffey _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Mr. Egan _____
 Mr. Gurnea _____
 Mr. Harbo _____
 Mr. Hendon _____
 Mr. Mumford _____
 Mr. Starke _____
 Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Mr. Nease _____
 Miss Gandy _____

b3 Per CIA
 b7E

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

COPY GVH

REC:AF

TO: MR. E. A. TAMM ^{EAL} 5734

November 7, 1944

FROM: E. P. COFFEY ^{ERC}

SUBJECT: ~~Development of Secret Ink Striping Machine for Testing Letters in Mass Quantities~~

Last summer when I visited the main Censorship testing station in New York City I observed up there that they were doing some research work attempting to build a mechanical striping device for more rapidly putting chemical test stripes on letters or transfer sheets from letters in order to test stripes on letters or transfer sheets from letters in order to test for secret ink. I was also impressed while there with the fact that they had well over a hundred people sitting at tables doing this test striping by hand. When I was there the mechanical striping model which they were working on had not been perfected and was not successful. Subsequently we discussed this mechanical striping in the Laboratory and it was agreed that even though we did not have nearly the large volume of original mail to test stripe as did Censorship, nevertheless a faster method of striping for certain situations would certainly be useful to us. Special Agent Magee, a chemist in the Laboratory, later also visited the New York censorship center and saw the work that was going on there as well as their experimental work on the striping machine.

b3 Per CIA
b7E

Subsequent to this and at odd times, Magee built up a very neatly working piece of machinery for doing this mass striping on quantities of letters. The first working model which he completed utilized gravity systems and fed the various chemical reagents through thin glass tubes as many as 8 or 10 at a time. This was arranged by a blocking device controlled by a photoelectric cell so that as each piece of paper reached the proper point in the machine the glass tube applicators were lowered and came in contact with the paper, depositing the various chemical reagents. When the paper left the point an automatic device threw back the glass tube applicators.

Magee was not satisfied with the net working efficiency of this particular model principally because the gravity feed did not give a constant and well-controlled flow of the chemical reagents. Also for this reason it did not have particular application to any of our work in its unimproved stage.

More recently he has made some changes in the device so that 10 different chemical reagents are now pumped up through glass tubes and down on to the final applicators. The pumping device is so connected that it operates automatically as the paper reaches the exact desired point and the pressure flow is stopped when the paper leaves that point. This is now working in a highly satisfactory manner. This puts us in a very nice position to handle any sudden large volume of material that has to be tested.

In the normal day's work it is not necessary to utilize the machine but it would be very useful in any emergency where we had this large amount of material.

The machine is over-all constructed very ruggedly. It includes a positive feeding device whereby the papers are fed in and carried under the

EX - 40

55 JAN 1 1945

1945

RECORDED 80-604-323
INDEXED
DEC 20 1944

2 Memo Mr. Tamm

Nov. 7, 1944

applicators between two endless belts. It has a maximum production speed of from four to five thousand pieces per day.

It is our understanding that normally Censorship gets a production of 75 pieces per day per person by the old method of hand striping. We recently learned that they have designed a sort of hand model of the original striper they were working on. This was seen in the Censorship Washington laboratory last week by Messrs. Baughman, Magee, and Powell. This hand model consists of a series of applicators arranged in a holder which are dipped in tubes of chemicals and then applied across the paper by hand. Apparently, therefore, Censorship was not successful in their efforts to construct a faster machine-driven striper.

ADDENDUM: 11-9-44 Special Agent J. W. Magee of the Laboratory has done an unusually good piece of work here and I recommend that he receive a letter of commendation from the Director for his efforts.

EPC

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

WJB:ams

TO : INSPECTOR MYRON E. GURNEA *WJB*

FROM : William J. Bradley *WJB*

SUBJECT: Test Secret Ink Messages to the Bureau

DATE: November 11, 1944

Special Agent Keith Angell has recommended that the powder type of secret communications be used, that said messages be printed and that the cover text be typed, with the code that is employed being as simple as possible.

*already not
for
in
no*

In addition, Mr. Angell suggested that drop boxes in Latin America be established and that messages from undercover men in one country be received in another country, then decoded and promptly transmitted to the Bureau by the Office of the Legal Attache.

*Benny
done
WJB*

Special Agent MacLennan has suggested that messages should be submitted to the Bureau via pouch channels for security reasons and that under such a set-up the agent in the field would still receive the benefit of employing the secret methods of communication furnished him while at the same time British authorities or Censorship officials would not have the opportunity of subjecting these communications to scrutiny. MacLennan also suggested that the Bureau on sending the secret communication to an agent in the field address him by number so that in the event the pouch were intercepted, the agent's identity would nevertheless remain secret.

ENCLOSURE

RECORDED

*memo. cited
12-18-44
WJB*

EX-44 32 DEC 26 1944

80-604-432-7

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Jones
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

EPC:AF

TO :

MR. E. A. TAMM

DATE:

12/22/44

FROM :

E. P. COFFEY

SUBJECT:

Major Benson Alexander Bull
Office of Scientific Research and Development
Secret Ink Project

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Jones
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

Major Bull of OSRD was referred to me by Mr. Pennington. The Major stated that OSRD had been assigned a project, the object of which was to be able to detect the use of and presence of secret inks in communications transmitted by enemy prisoners of war in this country to their homeland. He stated that confidentially

He cautioned me that this information

was "Top secret".

b3 Per CIA

b7D

b7E

Major Bull stated he would like to obtain from the FBI all the information it had concerning secret inks and their uses. I told Major Bull that Dr. Richter and Mr. Chadwell, both of OSRD, had been studying this subject matter for over a year and that they had had several conferences with the Laboratory technicians of the FBI and covered the secret ink field rather thoroughly. I asked him if he was aware of this and whether he had contacted Richter and Chadwell. Major Bull then confessed that actually he was a patent attorney and that he had been given the assignment of going to the Patent Office and searching their patents on secret inks and writing paper which would be proof against secret ink and that when he found nothing in the Patent Office somebody in OSRD told him it might be a good idea to drop by and see the FBI. He stated he knew both Richter and Chadwell and did know that they were engaged on a secret ink project but did not know they had been over to the FBI. He stated he would return to OSRD and talk with those two gentlemen.

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

180-604-325
31 DEC 27 1944

EX-70

414
55 DEC 30 1944

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TFB:AL

TO : E. P. Coffey *EP*

DATE: December 18, 1944

FROM : T. F. Baughman *TFB*

SUBJECT: Test Secret Ink Messages to the Bureau.

Reference is made to the attached communication to Mr. Gurnea from SA William J. Bradley in the above-entitled matter. SA Keith Angell according to this memorandum of November 11th has recommended that the powder type of secret communication be used. This apparently indicates that Mr. Angell prefers this method of secret writing to any other; however, I disagree with the recommendation inasmuch as it is not believed that any one method of secret writing should be used to the exclusion of all others.

The memorandum also states that SA MacLennan has suggested that the Bureau on sending secret communications to an Agent in the field address him by number so that in the event the pouch were intercepted the Agent's identity would nevertheless remain secret. This memorandum is merely for the purpose of stating that in the Physics and Chemistry Section we do not address any messages directly to SIS men operating under cover and any communications addressed here to an SIS man would be only to the Legal Attache.

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Coffey	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Mumford	
Mr. Starke	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

Attachment

50 JAN 2 1945

RECORDED

180-604-32

32 DEC 26 1944

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

RHC:AWK
 TO : 80-604 E. P. Coffey *EP*
 FROM : T. F. Baughman
 SUBJECT: Secret Ink Research, Monthly Report.

DATE: 1/2/45

Mr. Tolson
 Mr. E. A. Tamm
 Mr. Clegg
 Mr. Coffey
 Mr. Glavin
 Mr. Ladd
 Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Rosen
 Mr. Tracy
 Mr. Mohr
 Mr. Carson
 Mr. Hendon
 Mr. Mumford
 Mr. Jones
 Mr. Quinn Tamm
 Tele. Room
 Mr. Nease
 Miss Beahm
 Miss Gandy

Secret ink research for the 30 days preceding this date was directed toward testing of the basic principles involved in the construction of the automatic striping machine. No other formalized research was undertaken during this month.

The above information is for record purposes, and is to be placed in the Secret Ink File, 80-604.

awk
 6 JAN 15 1945

RECORDED

JAN 10 1945

Office of the Legal Attache
Buenos Aires, Argentina
December 8, 1944

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
VIA DIPLOMATIC AIR COURIER POUCH

Director, FBI

Re: WRITING MATERIAL STANDARDS

Attn: Technical Laboratory

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated November 3, 1944, captioned as above, instructing this office to obtain certain information concerning the so-called Franklin Pen. Please be advised that the Stratopen is the same pen as the Franklin Pen and that the pen has many specific purposes beyond that of avoiding the effects of low pressure at high altitude. The pen is designed to replace completely the pens of normal make. The Bureau has undoubtedly noticed that the pen sent to it is inferior in quality from the standpoint of workmanship and materials. However, the principle upon which the pen works (a principle which is completely unknown to the writer as it probably is to the inventor himself) is apparently completely sound, and it is said pens are being manufactured in England at the present time which are allegedly infinitely superior to the normal fountain pen.

The inventor of the pen is an Austrian whose name is not available at the present time. The man handling the pen for the inventor is Henry Martin of Henry Martin & Company, a large import-export concern in Buenos Aires. Mr. Martin is British and a proprietor of a four or five million pesos (\$1,250,000 U.S.) concern. Mr. Martin frankly advised that he was having considerable trouble with the patents covering the Stratopen and that he was not disposed to give any information to anybody concerning the pen until he had had a chance to complete the descriptions of the claims and completely protect the pen in the United States and England. Mr. Martin stated that in the very near future new patents will be applied for in both the United States and England. Practically no information was obtained from Mr. Martin concerning the pen. Mr. Martin was of the impression at the time of the conversation that the inquiry about his pen came from the Bureau of Standards.

Mr. Martin stated that the best place to obtain information concerning the pen would be from Garrard Winston of Sherman & Sterling,

78 FEB 1 1945

1945


Re: WRITING MATERIAL STANDARDS

55 Wall Street, New York City. The Bureau will recall that the law firm of Sherman & Sterling represent the National City Bank and Winston is a partner of Sherman & Sterling. Mr. Martin stated that Winston has handled all the business in connection with the patenting of the pen and will be able to furnish the latest information concerning the pen, including changes which have been or are being made in the pen.

For the information of the Bureau, practically all the pen manufacturing companies in the United States at the present time are either manufacturing this pen or have licenses through Eberhard Faber to do so on a royalty basis. The exclusive rights, however, for the manufacturer of the pen are with Eberhard Faber. It is quite likely that the pens can be obtained from either Mr. Winston or from Eberhard Faber, although Mr. Martin stated that he did not really suppose that the pens were being manufactured in the United States at the present time. However, they are being manufactured both in Argentina and England. Mr. Martin pointed out that the pen manufactured in England (and he supposes that the pen manufactured in the United States will have the same characteristics) is infinitely superior to the Argentine products because of the difference in workmanship and materials. It is thought that perhaps the Bureau will desire to obtain some of the finer pens in order to complete its standards. There are forwarded herewith two additional pens of Argentine make.

Mr. Martin advised finally that Mr. Winston will be able to furnish complete information about the patent numbers and also particulars about the new patent claims which are being made. It is of some interest to note that Mr. Martin has had trouble with his patents on the part of a certain American who has undertaken to take out similar claims and for this reason he may be a little bit reluctant to furnish information about his patents. However, no difficulty is expected from Mr. Winston along this line.

Very truly yours,


Francis E. Crosby,
L.A.

cc: (2) Technical Laboratory

FEC/jar

ENC.

(2)

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



RHC:AWK
80-604
cc 62-62736

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

January 29, 1945

CC-287

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Piper _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Beahm _____
Miss Gandy _____

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. COFFEY *EM*

Re: ~~Censorship~~ Censorship Contacts; Combined
Monthly and Quarterly Report. b3 Per CIA
b7E

During the past 30 days we have had two contacts with personnel of the Censorship laboratory. On December 29, 1944 Dr. Pierce came over to discuss the [redacted] solution we analyzed for the State Department under file number [redacted]. On January 15, 1945 Dr. Pierce and a Mr. White of the Censorship laboratory came over to discuss the secret ink in the Colepaugh and Gimpel case [redacted] with Messrs. Baughman and Duckett in the presence of J. A. Martin and Supervisors Gannon and Powell. Dr. Pierce was given our findings to that date including the fact that the secret ink furnished to Colepaugh and Gimpel would be developed by [redacted] plus sunlight or other ultraviolet source. At this time Dr. Pierce presented a specimen of their multiple striping gadget for our benefit and use. Mr. J. A. Martin, in whose office these matters were discussed, also presented comments on the "dots" in this case.

During the quarter ended December 31, 1944, five contacts with laboratory personnel of Censorship have been had in addition to those reported above. The five contacts are as follows:

September 29, 1944 Dr. Pierce and Phillip Wolgemuth came over to describe the plans for chemical striping all outgoing mail by then.

October 9, 1944 Dr. Pierce and Mr. Wolgemuth presented you with results of their work on [redacted] b3 Per CIA
b7E

November 3, 1944 Messrs. Baughman and Magee went over to their laboratory to discuss exhaustive striping, [redacted] the multiple applicator, new developer paper for aniline pencil secret writing and the Goldschmidt letter.

November 10, 1944 Mr. Philip Wolgemuth was given further details on the Goldschmidt letter in Supervisor Felt's Office.

November 23, 1944 Dr. Pierce came over to discuss technical phases of microdots. *ED*

Respectfully,

T. F. Baughman



RECEIVED-COLLEA

78 FEB 16 1945

RECORDED & INDEXED

180-604-328
FBI
38 JAN 31 1945

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7c

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

L2-1409-3

27 January 1945

CORP
EPC
res

Memorandum for: C. Darwin Marron

Subject: ^Q Secret Writing

The following instructions for the use of ~~secret ink~~ were given to a German agent. This is being forwarded for your information.

Take a soup spoon of alcohol heated to 90° C; dissolve in it one aspirin tablet. To write, take pointed match, wrap end in cotton and write very lightly.

The s/w message was to be written on the reverse side of an ordinary letter. The page upon which the s/w appeared was to be indicated by a small and lightly inscribed letter "x" in the upper left-hand corner of the page.

To develop the s/w, the paper was to be passed over glycerin.

J. George Gately
J. George Gately
X-2 Branch
at

RECORDED

&
INDEXED

121

80-604-329

32 FEB 7 1945

RHC
Index and file
1-24-45
1-24-45
1-24-45

79 FEB 16 1945 *121*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

L2-1407

12 January 1945

Memorandum for: Mr. C. Darwin Marron

Subject:

Secret Writing

Spain Exp. 2
France Exp. 2

1. Following is a ~~secret~~ ink formula furnished by the German Intelligence Service in Barcelona to one of their agents about to depart on a mission in France.

"Dissolve a pill of any purgative in a small container of ammonia. If the ammonia becomes a bright red, one can use the solution as invisible ink. A wooden tooth-pick is used as a pen."

"This ink can be used on paper or on white linen (shirts, handkerchiefs, underwear). The linen may be dirty, but not dampened or washed."

"In the case when one would notice traces of writing on the paper, rub it with a circular motion with paper of the same quality."

"The pills furnished to the agent as an example bear the name ~~Laxen-Busto~~ and are sold in Spain."

RECORDED

J. George Gately
X-2 Branch

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

171

20 FEB 7 1945

56 FEB 16 1945

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES~~
WASHINGTON, D. C.

b6
b7c

Coffey EPC

TTH 15 January 1945

L2-1409

Memorandum for: Mr. C. Darwin Marron

Subject: Preparation and Use of Secret Ink

The attached memorandum on the subject was given by an enemy agent and was copied verbatim.

J. George Gately
J. George Gately
X-2 Branch

Attachment

0 Detection and Identification of Secret, Invisible and Synthetic Ink and Writing

Rec'd 1-24-45 met

Rec'd Rite Wge

207 69-XE

turn
16a
RECORDED & INDEXED
80-604-331
69-XE
FEB 7 1945

EPC

~~SECRET~~

56 FEB 17 1945

~~SECRET~~

PREPARATION AND USE OF SECRET INK

1. "Secret ink called PEROGEN was made in the following way:- I was given four little lumps of yellow colored cotton-wool. These were wrapped in tissue paper and kept in a small glass container. To make the ink, the cotton was put into a little medicine bottle which was filled with "Leitungswasser". This ink could be used for writing by putting a toothpick in the liquid and writing the letters on ordinary paper. It was very difficult to use because the liquid evaporated so quickly that one could hardly finish one letter between dips. This liquid could also be used in a fountain pen. This ink had been used by the Abwehr for a very long time; however, the chemical department found out a few days before my departure that this liquid could only be used in a fountain pen in which all the metal parts were gold. Also it was necessary to use rain water because iron and other metal substances would make the writing legible. On receipt of such a secret ink letter, the paper was put in a special chemical solution and the writing could then be read. Therefore, these letters could be read when they were put in a liquid containing metal. As this ink was very expensive and only could be made with the greatest difficulties, and as the raw materials came from abroad, I was told to look after it very carefully.

2. Also I was given a special microscope made by ZEISS. The microscope was screwed into a very heavy, 20 cm high, 7cm broad metal container. In the microscope there were special lenses with mirrors which could be lit by a pocket flashlight. This microscope was meant for deciphering microphotographs. The High Command in Hamburg had a professional photographer in their photo laboratory who kept the microphotograph machines in a secret room. I am not a technician but the outfit for microphotography looked as follows:-

There were rails mounted on a long steel beam. In the middle there was an electric microscope under which the piece (or pieces) of printed paper was put. The microscope had a lens construction on both sides which mirrored the paper underneath. On the left side at the end of the beam there was a movable reddish-purple lamp, and on the right side a queer shaped camera. The process needed a two-hour exposure, and in one exposure period 10 or 20

~~SECRET~~

~~ENCLOSURE~~

80-604-331

~~SECRET~~

Secret Ink - 2

pictures were taken. This microphotography reduced the papers to a tiny pinpoint photograph. The film was then developed and these tiny pinpoints cut out in a special machine with the help of a microscope. These pinpoint-photos were then pasted over a typewritten letter or period in an ordinary letter, and thus sent to an agent. The agent knew that, for instance, the fifth "i" or the sixth period in the text held the photo. With the help of his special microscope (which enlarged 132 times) focused on the particular letter, the agent could read the pinpoint-photo. I had the opportunity to see this secret arrangement twice for a quarter of an hour, although it was strictly forbidden, but owing to my lack of technical knowledge I cannot explain the full technical procedure.

3. These pinpoint-photos were sent through various channels to neutral countries and from there forwarded through direct or indirect routes to the agents in the enemy countries. With the help of this microscope one could thus send detailed instructions and could make sure that they passed through the censorship, who censored and sent on the ordinary business letters in which they were put. The only danger was when these letters were washed in a liquid that would dissolve or wash away the pinpoint-photograph."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

L2-1409-2

17 January 1945

Co FFE

Memorandum for: Mr. C. Darwin Marron

Subject: Secret Ink

The attached memorandum is transmitted for your information.

J. George Gately
J. George Gately
X-2 Branch

Attachment

Rtc

*Reflections and Introduction of Secret, Invisible, a
in Signatures and a Writing*

*indexed
5/6
1-24-45
mub*

7

80-604-332

RECORDED

80-604-332
FEB 7 1945

EX-68

OK

56 FEB 20 1945 ⁴²³

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET INKS

Materials:

A piece of glass about 40 centimeters square

A small bowl filled with a liquid used in developing

Some thick blotters of English type

White paper

An ordinary pencil

Method

A sheet of paper is dipped into the bowl and then spread out on the square of glass where it is dried with the thick blotting paper. A second sheet is then placed on the sheet which has been dried and one writes thereon with an ordinary pencil (not indelible) using printed letters. Next again put a blotter on the first sheet, which is merely a copy, to prevent spreading which would make the developing very difficult.

The agent received a certain quantity of paper for his informers since this type of paper was unobtainable in France.

Note: It was stated that the German Intelligence was in possession of 25 secret ink procedures, notably the "Wilhelm" method in which a match is used.

~~SECRET~~

80-604-332

ED. D. H. LADD

1/18/45
WJP:edm

MR. S. S. Alden

Reference is made to Mr. T. P. Baughman's memorandum to Mr. Coffey, dated November 10, 1944, relative to the new policy of striping documents which was recently put into effect by the Office of Censorship. Since this policy does not affect all mail, it was deemed necessary to ascertain the channels of communication which would be affected because the Bureau in the operation of double agents and in conducting other security investigations frequently finds it necessary to prepare letters addressed to drop boxes and facilitate the letters through Censorship. The opportunity for the principals to detect that these letters are controlled would be enhanced if multiple stripes in accordance with the new Censorship procedure are left off these communications. The new policy would also affect the Bureau in cases wherein Censorship forwards original letters to the Bureau for examination as the result of Special Watch Listing and are tested in our laboratory. When returned to Censorship they are in the same condition as received. If these letters are then put back in the mail channels for forwarding to the addressees and do not contain the multiple stripes, they would obviously create a suspicion in the minds of the recipients since all mail destined for that particular country may be subject to the striping process. Set out below is a list of the countries and areas that are subjected to this close scrutiny by Censorship in processing all letters with the multiple irremovable stripes:

1. Argentina
2. Sweden
3. Switzerland
4. Portugal
5. Spain
6. Turkey
7. Occupied China
8. Those areas of Russia adjacent to Japan
9. Recently liberated European areas, provided mail service is in operation. If there is a possibility that the mail may be returned to sender by post office because of "no mail service", the communications are tested with removable stripes only.

It is significant that all other mail receives removable stripes only. This does not mean this mail is always tested - only if time permits. The critical mail will receive first priority.

Censorship further advised that before striping the irremovable stripes are obliterated to prevent easy identification. The communication is then placed in a container of type containing [redacted] and placed on the communication with a cellulose sponge and then [redacted].

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Jones _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

79 FEB 22 1945

Memorandum for Mr. D. M. Ladd

- 2 -

Arrangements have been made with Dr. Pierce of the Office of Censorship for the Bureau Laboratory to use the multiple stripe device on original communications examined in our Laboratory when the communication is addressed to individuals in the countries and areas listed herein. The hand device has been received from Censorship and delivered to Mr. Baughman.

It is significant to note that incoming mail to the United States will not be subject to the irremovable stripe processing and therefore communications thus addressed and which are subject to laboratory examination in the Bureau should be in the majority of instances "cleaned up" before return to Censorship, since this will be in accordance with their policy of nonmutilation of incoming mail. This is necessary due to the fact that American business firms and individuals frequently are offended by Censorship's mutilation of mail received by them and state their protests to Mr. Price, Director of Censorship. Mr. Price feels that such mutilation should be kept to the absolute minimum and therefore the irremovable stripes are not being placed on incoming U. S. mail. This factor should be kept in mind by the Bureau Laboratory in testing such communications so that exhaustive tests which may result in mutilation will not be made unless the Bureau Supervisor has requested this exhaustive testing in order to detect possible secret writing. When such mutilation occurs, the letter either should be simulated or condemned.

ACTION:

There is attached for your approval a memorandum to all Section Chiefs in the Security Division calling attention to this new procedure and how it will affect communications passing through U. S. Censorship in the future.

Attachment



Copy bjw

MEMORANDUM - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TFB:MR
80-604

Date: January 29, 1945

To: MR. COFFEY

From: T. F. BAUGHMAN

Subject: CENSORSHIP - GENERAL; SECRET INK TESTING

Reference is made to Mr. S. S. Alden's memorandum for Mr. Ladd dated January 18, 1945, detailing the procedure of Censorship in their use of their multiple-stripe device as applied to certain mail channels.

The contents of the reference memorandum have been discussed with the secret ink examiners, and in compliance with the data in that memorandum the following policy has been adopted.

All mail for the below-listed areas is being subjected to processing by the multiple-stripe technique, employing the multiple-stripe device used by Censorship in order that the appearance of material examined by us may be similar to that of material examined by Censorship:

1. Argentina
2. Sweden
3. Switzerland
4. Portugal
5. Spain
6. Turkey
7. Occupied China
8. Those areas of Russia adjacent to Japan
9. Recently liberated European areas, provided mail service is in operation. If there is a possibility that the mail may be returned to sender by post office because of "no mail service," the communications are tested with removable stripes only.

Following the treatment of the material with the multiple-stripping device, the scrambling solution will be employed in accordance with the procedure of Censorship. The necessity for not leaving visible stains on incoming mail will be kept in mind in the examination of material furnished by Censorship.

In any case of question as to what constitutes mail falling in certain doubtful categories, such as that listed under number nine above, i. e., recently liberated European areas, we will check with Censorship through Liaison to determine whether the material should be tested with removable stripe reagents only.

80-604-334
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FEB 7 1945
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EX-61

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

78 FEB 16 1945

OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

L2-1387

19 December 1944

Memorandum for: Mr. C. Darwin Marron

Subject: Secret Writing

The attached memorandum is for your information.

J. George Gately
X-2 Branch

Attachment

RECORDED

INDEXED

~~SECRET~~

DEC 23 1944
RHC
RLL

Secret Ink

*7 me
1 ENCL 3
30*

Typing of ink

*Recheck 1-4-45
Gately was NO
Future information
This is very important*

*Winningham
H. L. Gately*

Carroll

8

CONFIDENTIAL

TTH

~~SECRET~~

SECRET WRITING

Two new and interesting examples of secret writing material have recently been obtained in Italy.

1. Ink

Two new types of ink of exactly the same color are used. One is an ordinary ink and the other is an ink which has a chemical reaction when specially treated.

The letters of the secret message are written in the special ink and distributed amongst the words in the cover text which is in ordinary ink.

2. Typewriter Ribbon

Typewriter ribbon is used in much the same way. It consists of a specially treated ribbon, one half of which has a chemical reaction but is undistinguishable from the letters written with the other half of the ribbon.

When the message is typed, the two portions of the ribbon are used to distribute the letters of the secret message into the cover text.

~~SECRET~~

80-604-335

~~ENCLOSURE~~



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

February 3, 1945

RHG:AWK
80-604

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. COFFEY *Q/M*

Re: Secret Writing Information
from OSS

Secret Code

The short, blind memoranda from OSS regarding secret inks are remarkably consistent in the generality of their phrasing and paucity of actual technical data. While most of the materials so far received deal with general methods of which we already know the details, the indicated sources often differ from ours, thus making me wonder what pertinent information we are missing. A typical example of such a communication is attached hereto, being a blind memorandum under cover of a memorandum from OSS dated December 19, 1944. The subject matter of this communication deals very briefly with two types of secret inks, giving the source as Italy. Both of these methods are covered in detail report and supplement dealing Both of these methods are of considerable interest to the laboratory.

RECOMMENDATION:


It is recommended that this memorandum be forwarded to the Liaison Section for their information."

Respectfully,

T.F.B.

T. F. Baughman

cc-Liaison Section



EX-8
55 FEB 27 1945
48

RECORDED 180-604-336
FEB 13 1945

7

SECRET

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Piper _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Beahm _____
Miss Gandy _____

b7D
b7E

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



RHC:AWK
80-604
cc 62-62736

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

February 12, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. COFFEY

Re: Secret ink testing -
multiple applicator.

Reference is made to United States Censorship Technical Operations Bulletin #71, dated January 13, 1945, which states the observations of the Balboa Censorship Laboratory concerning the use of censorship's multiple applicator for secret ink reagents. I would like to call your attention to the fact that the observations of the Balboa laboratory agree essentially with the expectations of the secret ink examiners with regard to the following quoted points:

- "1. Examiners must avoid a tendency to test letters more mechanically" (than with single striping).
- "2. There is less control in avoiding mutilation of ink-written letters that may be affected by some of the reagents". (This is also true of much typewriting).
- "3. There exists a tendency to do rush examinations".

The Balboa laboratory further states with regard to the disadvantages (of multiple striping) "we again call particular attention to the danger of incomplete observation of the reagents as they are applied".

Our secret ink examiners have encountered no difficulty in simulating the censorship multiple stripes; as a matter of fact, examples of their work are usually sloppy in appearance compared to ours. Where circumstances demand, the secret ink examiners are simulating the multiple striping technique by the use of a ruler to guide the reagent swab, at the same time achieving the accuracy of the single striping technique.

Preliminary statistics show, under the new censorship policy of exhaustively striping documents going to certain areas, that approximately 10% to 15% of the specimens must be given this additional treatment that would otherwise be afforded only non-striping or removable stripe technique.

CC-287

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Piper _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Beahm _____
Miss Gandy _____

0 Detection and Production of secret ink & writing material & equipment including multiple applicator for reagents

RECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-62736 - 1925

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

February 10, 1945

RHC:AL
80-604

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. COFFEY *ELC*

Re: Secret Ink: ~~SIS~~
Statistics.

Reference is made to Mr. D. J. Parsons' oral request of Mr. Chambers for data reflecting the number of secret ink messages sent to the Bureau by SIS men in the field prior to the inauguration of U.S. Censorship.

While U. S. Censorship stations did not open simultaneously, it was established that the first U. S. Censorship began functioning on January 2, 1942. According to the Secret Ink Unit's records, 74 men had been given secret ink training prior to the inauguration of Censorship. Of these, it has been possible to tabulate the number of secret ink messages sent by 30 men. The total number of secret ink messages sent by these 30 men prior to January 2, 1942 amounts to 89, or an average of 3 messages each. There is attached hereto a list of SIS men trained prior to January 2, 1942, including a tabulation of the number of messages sent by each of the agents whose file has been examined to date.

Respectfully,

T.F.R.
T. F. Baughman

Attachment



78 FEB 24 1945

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

Am
80-604-338
F B I
31 FEB 15 1945
7-ELC

<u>NAME</u>	<u>NO. LETTERS</u>
Jack West	7
Robert M. Carswell	0
Heber M. Clegg	0
William J. Bradley	24
John M. Speakes	0
Walter C. Rogers	0
Joseph W. Kiernan	9
H. Darrel Taylor	0
John Barry Hubbard	1
Adolph G. Hauer	0
Donald B. Clegg	9
Tobias E. Matthews	5
Harry F. Clifford	2
Jackson C. Davis	1
George H. Harvey	10
Robert L. Melberg	0
John Alan Weyl	2
V. W. Prospere	3
George R. Blue	2
Howard P. Winter	0
William L. Shea	3
James A. Hunt	1
William C. Beaulieu	0
H. B. Judell	0
Francis B. Richardson	0
Don C. Bird	3
George E. Danielson	6
Samuel K. Lothrop	1
Roger T. Stone	0
Richard C. Godfrey	0

DATA HAVE NOT BEEN DETERMINED ON THE FOLLOWING:

Thomas V. Pittman	Isna Lee Price
William B. Caldwell	Ralph E. Rawlings
L. C. Beck	John C. Oakes
Owen F. McGarron	Thos. H. Davis
Robert W. Wall	Ruskin R. Lines
John F. Sullivan	Charles E. McNabb
Rolf L. Larson	Wm. M. Wheeler
Mortimer S. Copeland	Leo J. Fox
Leonard Greenburg	A. Ledyard Smith
Robert Earl Gocke	Joseph F. DeFranco
Chester J. Peterson	T. A. Keatinh
John Babbage	H. F. Danner
Raymond Coward	Joseph M. Kelly
Nathan L. Ferris	J. W. Curtis
R. H. Dreher	
R. H. Collier	
L. M. Padgett	
Blake G. Keneally	
Harold F. Swenson	
James P. McMahan	
R. M. Durkin	
J. C. O'Connor	
R. J. O'Mara	
T. C. Tegan	
Wm. C. Moran	
Howard K. Rutherford	
Frank G. Siscoe	
John G. Groves	
Bernard J. Fitzpatrick	
Clarence W. Moore	

ENCLOSURE

80-604-338

20
X
DJP:EH

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
FRANCIS M. SHEA

February 10, 1945

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR, FBI

RECORDED

INVENTION OF JOSEPH WILLIAM MAGEE
FOR "CHEMICAL TESTING DEVICE"

EX-9

80-604-339

Further reference is made to your letter of December 7, 1944, regarding this patent matter.

Since the potential value of this chemical testing device is almost exclusively in connection with war time government activities and it is the intention to offer it for government use, it is requested that this application be filed at the earliest possible date.

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Jones _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAILED

FEB 13 1945

FEB 15 3 38 PM '45

79 FEB 28 1945

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DJP:EH

TO : MR. E. P. COFFEY *etc.*

DATE: February 9, 1945

FROM : MR. D. J. PARSONS

SUBJECT:

RE: INVENTION OF JOSEPH WILLIAM MAGEE
FOR "CHEMICAL TESTING DEVICE"

I telephonically inquired of Mr. Robert Kirkwood of the Department as to the present status of the patent application on this secret ink stripping machine. He told me that he was working on the final draft, but had had several interruptions due to expeditious cases. We have supplied him with the set of drawings made by Mr. Probst of the Laboratory and Kirkwood volunteered that they were excellent drawings. I inquired as to the date when the application will be filed and Kirkwood said that if he did not receive any other cases taking precedence that this application would be filed about the middle of March, and we could help assure this by submitting a memorandum requesting expeditious handling in view of the potential war time use of the instrument. Since Kirkwood indicated that without this memorandum other expedite cases would push the date of our application later into the spring or the summer I have prepared and am attaching hereto a memorandum to Mr. Shea requesting preferred attention be given this patent.

Attachment

RECORDED
&
INDEXED156-14-339
FEB 13 1945

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Jones	
Mr. Quinn	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

Secret Writing

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

RHC:AWK 80-604 cc 62-62736

TO : E. P. COFFEY *epc*

DATE: February 20, 1945

FROM : T. F. BAUGHMAN *TFB*

~~HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: ~~Censorship~~ Contacts - Laboratory.

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey *epc* _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Acers _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Starke _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

On the afternoon of February 14, 1945, Mr. Chambers went down to Mr. Boherty's office to discuss several topics of mutual interest to Censorship and the FBI Laboratory. The discussion was had with Dr. Willard S. Breon of Censorship's Laboratory.

In connection with the striping of the inside of envelopes, it was ascertained that U. S. Censorship laboratory presently steams open and stripes at random either with minor or major testing. This is done under the same policy regarding the choice of stripes as is used in the treatment of the enclosures. Censorship does not stripe the interior of envelopes which belong to Watch List submissions. Dr. Breon stated that it would be quite satisfactory for us to test the interior of envelopes as we choose, without the necessity of informing Censorship prior to such testing. It was stated that no attempt was made by Censorship to apply the permanently staining stripes in such a way as to prevent their appearance from being prominent. Censorship's selection of envelopes to be tested is more or less at random, depending upon the mail channels and the opinion of the examiner.

Censorship's progress in the handling of differential inks and typewriting was inquired into, and it was brought out that their chief attack of these systems was to take a wet transfer of the writing and subject that transfer to tests for chloride and compounds capable of undergoing diazo reactions. Dr. Breon stated that their chief problem in this connection was to avoid the permanent removal of the visible ink in testing for differential ink systems. No indication could be found that Dr. Breon has any knowledge of the chemicals presently employed by the Bureau in its differential ink system. Their approach to the problem is that the ink will contain as an additive either an organic compound or chloride, to the exclusion of any heavy metals such as we use. Dr. Breon states that they regard only the "dye" inks (those containing no metals) as being adaptable to differential systems. Censorship laboratory has available samples [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and Dr. Breon stated that he would forward such samples to this laboratory for testing. Dr. Breon also stated that he would forward the summary of their research to date on the differential systems upon its completion in the near future.

Information concerning a new system of developing secret ink writing of unknown composition was furnished to Breon. This consists of a German method involving leaving the invisible writing in a press in contact with dry bromide paper for 24 or more hours and subsequent development in a normal fashion, but without any previous exposure to white light. Dr. Breon expressed great interest in this topic, indicating that they had no previous knowledge of such a method and expressing considerable concern over the possibilities of its future use by the enemy.

78 MAR 6 1945 *epc*

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

47 FEB 27 1945

180-604-340

EX-100
REC-100

Page 1

lc
Bureau Bulletin #17
February 28, 1945

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

(B) ~~SECRET INK~~; LABORATORY EXAMINATION. -- In order that all Agents may be aware of the present policy concerning the examination of documents for the presence of secret ink, the following is set out. The laboratory examination of communications for the presence of secret inks is divided into two categories. The specific type of examination desired when material is submitted to the laboratory should be designated. (A) (U)

- (1) Unless otherwise requested, "exhaustive" examination of the submitted specimens will automatically be made. This usually results in some alteration of the appearance, and occasionally partial destruction or mutilation of the document, as such testing is designed to detect the presence of all known secret inks. (A) (U)
- (2) When it is desired that no detectable alteration in the document take place, a "nonstaining" examination should be requested. Such an examination might be desired, for example, when the evidence must be allowed to proceed in normal channels as though it has not been subjected to examination. This type of examination is to reveal indications of the presence of secret ink and will not necessarily develop the message. Because of this factor the nonstaining type of examination is necessarily of limited character. In many cases it has been possible to develop secret ink messages by using nonstaining methods without the original appearance of the paper having been permanently changed. Should the importance of the case justify it, an exhaustive examination can be made of the original document and a simulation thereof be prepared for transmittal to the addressee. Should this type of treatment be desired a specific request therefor should be made when the document is submitted for examination. (A) (U)

In all cases where documents are submitted by the field for secret ink examination, the type of examination desired should be specified. (A) (U)

Classified by SP-8 BJS/nm
Declassify on: OADR 6/9/83

180-604-✓
NOT RECORDED
55 MAR 3 1945

59 MAR 10 1945²⁸

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

66-03-648
ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

March 5, 1945

RHC:AL
80-604

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. COFFEY

Re: Censorship Testing of SIS
Secret Ink Communications

Secret Writing

A secret ink test message prepared by SIS #51 at Buenos Aires, January 23, 1945, was received in Mr. Carson's Section on February 6, 1945. Having been tested by Censorship for the presence of secret ink, this letter was held in Mr. Carson's Section in order to determine the reason therefor. It was found that the letter had been directed to a drop no longer in use.

This letter had been tested in the usual manner by diagonal stripes of the type which are removable or which do not show. Practically the entire surface of the paper was covered in this testing. The differential secret ink method had been employed and had not been detected. The specific reagent for the development of this particular secret ink was not present on the paper.

Respectfully,

T. F. Baughman
T. F. Baughman

*Has been
advised to discontinue
this drop*

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey *OK* _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson *OK* _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Piper _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Beahm _____
Miss Gandy _____



58 MAR 15 1945

RECORDED
EX-68

180-604-341

31 MAR 8 1945

SIS

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



RHC:MR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

February 17, 1945

CC-287a

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Acers _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Starke _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Beahm _____
Miss Gandy _____

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. COFFEY *DM*

Re: *O* Secret Ink Administrative;
Bureau Bulletin.

Handled Separately
There is attached hereto proposed copy for inclusion in a Bureau Bulletin for the guidance of field offices requesting secret ink examination of documents.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that this copy be incorporated in the next Bureau Bulletin.

Respectfully,

T.F.B.
T. F. Baughman

*Published in
Bureau Bulletin #17*
Attachment



53 MAR 24 1945
115

RECORDED & INDEXED

86-604-342
20 MAR 14 1945

EX-55

March 19, 1945

MEMORANDUM NO. 14
Series 1945

TO ALL FBI LEGAL ATTACHES:

(A) SECRET INK - LABORATORY EXAMINATION -- In order that all Agents may be aware of the present policy concerning the examination of documents for the presence of secret ink, the following is set out. The laboratory examination of communications for the presence of secret inks is divided into two categories. The specific type of examination desired when material is submitted to the laboratory should be designated.

1. Unless otherwise requested, "exhaustive" examination of the submitted specimens will automatically be made. This usually results in some alteration of the appearance, and occasionally partial destruction or mutilation of the document, as such testing is designed to detect the presence of all known secret inks.
2. When it is desired that no detectable alteration in the document take place, a "nonstaining" examination should be requested. Such an examination might be desired, for example, when the evidence must be allowed to proceed in normal channels as though it has not been subjected to examination. This type of examination is to reveal indications of the presence of secret ink and will not necessarily develop the message. Because of this factor the nonstaining type of examination is necessarily of limited character. In many cases it has been possible to develop secret ink messages by using non-staining methods without the original appearance of the paper having been permanently changed. Should the importance of the case justify it, an exhaustive examination can be made of the original document and a simulation thereof be prepared for transmittal to the addressee. Should this type of treatment be desired, a specific request therefor should be made when the document is submitted for examination.

In all cases where documents are submitted by the field for secret ink examination, the type of examination desired should be specified.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm

7-8 MAR 26 1945

180-604-
NOT RECORDED
MAR 24 1945

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-85-434

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

CC-287



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

March 13, 1945

RHC:AL
80-604
cc-62-62736

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. COFFEY

Re: ~~Laboratory Censorship~~ Contacts -
Monthly Report.

Dr. Willard S. Breon of Censorship Laboratory came over February 14, 1945 at our invitation to discuss several matters with Mr. Chambers.


It was determined from Dr. Breon that we can stripe the inside of envelopes with permanently visible secret ink testing at will and without previous advice to Censorship. Discussion was had in some detail concerning the newest phases of differential inks and differential typewriting. Dr. Breon is sending over samples of the differential typewriting. Contact secret ink writing and developing processes, both dry and wet, were discussed in detail.

Respectfully,

T. F. Baughman

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Piper _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Beahm _____
Miss Gandy _____


RECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-62736-112



57 MAR 30 1945

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

180-604-343
32 MAR 19 1945



~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

L2-1409-3

15 March 1945

Memorandum for: Mr. John F. Deherty
Subject: Preparation and Use of Secret Ink

The attached memorandum is transmitted for your
information.

J. George Gately
J. George Gately
X-2 Branch

Attachment

EX-50
(39)
22
EX

Spind
R.H.C.

RECORDED

EX-50 80-604-344
F B I
38 MAR 22 1945

51 APR 4 1945
115

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Preparation and Use of Secret Ink

The ash of one cigarette is diluted with a teaspoon of water. After at least several hours this solution is filtered. A match or a piece of wood is used with the ink to write a message in capital letters. The writing must be done lightly and the paper used not too smooth. The paper is then washed with cotton dabbed in clean alcohol and later placed between two other sheets and pressed in a book.

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

L2-1409-4

16 March 1945

Memorandum for: Mr. John F. Doherty
Subject: ~~Secret~~ Writing Pencil

The attached memorandum is transmitted for
your information.

J. George Gately
J. George Gately
X-2 Branch

Attachment

Secret Ink

RECEIVED

EX-71

EX-71
39

*Hi ind
RHK*

EX-71

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

62

180-604-346
F B I
38 MAR 22 1945

SEVEN

128
57 MAR 30 1945

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PENCIL USED FOR SECRET WRITING

1. The pencil is in the form of a match with a colored head, contained in a de luxe box of matches with different colored heads. After writing an ordinary letter with typewriter or ink, the letter is placed on glass and the agent was instructed to write with the head of the match at right angles to the text, skipping all clear or unwritten spaces. He was not to press too hard or too lightly. He saw the result developed: a specially prepared sheet of paper was placed over the letter and smoothed down. Upon removing it, the secret writing appeared on a clean sheet, but backwards. The signature "Heinrich," to the clear text meant that there was secret writing present. He heard of an "H" pencil, and a "G" pencil; he believes the first letter of the signature indicates the pencil used.

2. Letters to source were written in secret ink and were signed "Robert." If the "t" was written "t," there was a secret ink message; if " " (German script), there was none.

80-604-345
~~SECRET~~
ENCLOSURE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: February 5, 1945

FROM : S. S. Penny

FSP:ECR

SUBJECT: VALUE OF USED ENVELOPES
AS INVESTIGATIVE AID

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Jones
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

It will be recalled that due principally to information received from Colepaugh and Gimpel we have learned the Germans are utilizing a very good but simple type of secret writing based on the transfer of certain substances in ordinary ink. To prepare this type of secret writing the message is written in regular ink and permitted to dry. A sheet of paper which is going to carry the message is then placed over the ink writing and left in a press or under a weight for several hours. During this period the necessary substances are transferred from the writing on to the blank page and, while, according to the Laboratory, it is relatively simple to develop this secret ink, it has to be submitted to the proper process.

In connection with this type of secret writing it has been observed that quite frequently the writing on a letter will transfer to the inside of the envelope which has contained that letter. This would make it practical in certain cases for the Laboratory to attempt to develop what writing may have been transferred to the inside of envelopes obtained as the result of trash coverages and otherwise, even though the letter itself may be missing. In a case of sufficient importance the possibility here would appear to warrant reassembling an envelope which had been torn up in order that it might be tested for any leads which would appear as a result of the development of such writing.

It is not known if typewriting can be transferred in the same manner or if the ink on a typewriter ribbon has the qualities necessary to such a transfer process.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this memorandum be forwarded to the Laboratory for appropriate consideration and advice as to the possible value of submitting this information about recovered used envelopes to the field as an investigative aid. It is believed that such an aid, if practicable, will be of extreme value in criminal investigations as well as investigations of a security nature.

RECORDED & INDEXED

80-604-347

MAR 27 1945

57 APR 12 1945

~~SECRET~~

32

THE OFFICE OF CENSORSHIP
TECHNICAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

March 3, 1945

TECHNICAL OPERATIONS BULLETIN NO. 78

THE FOLLOWING IS RESTRICTED TO SSD PERSONNEL

FUTURE TRENDS IN S/W DETECTION

The rather startling developments in enemy secret writing techniques which have been discussed in general in TOB 75 and in recent technical notes have undoubtedly raised many questions in the minds of field station chemists as to how they should plan immediate and future operations so as to insure the maximum coverage for these new techniques and yet not ignore the possibility of older established methods being used. At no time in the history of the laboratory operation has it been more important for the field laboratory personnel to use every facility at their command to improve the quality of their laboratory coverage and actively to study the organizational aspects of their own operation in an effort to work out the most efficient routine of testing with the proper emphasis on mail selection, newly discovered methods, and established methods. The evidence is clear that the enemy is continuing, or even expanding his espionage operation in this hemisphere and it is more than encouraging that at the present time we have more positive information on what types of methods to expect than at any previous stage of the war.

The recommendations for future operation discussed in TOB 75 were arrived at after serious consideration of the present stage of development of enemy espionage in this hemisphere. The critical evaluation of laboratory operations included in the same Bulletin was presented from the same viewpoint and was intended not only to clarify TOD's thinking on this subject, but to stimulate active thought and research on the part of the field laboratories. It is possible at this time to describe in somewhat greater detail the present status of Censorship's knowledge of the types of concealment available to the German agent and to give some estimate of the relative value which is placed upon each. While some of this information has resulted from the piecing together of various scraps of information and may not be absolutely correct in all details, the bulk of it is quite clear cut, and indicates marked improvement in S/W methods and discovery of recent methods of rather

~~SECRET~~

of secret writing varied from insecure substances such as [] lemon juice, etc. to those of relatively high security such as pyramidon, []

b3 Per CIA
b7E

The rather wide scale apprehension of agents using such methods and development of successful counter measures by Censorship gradually led to the abandonment of most of these inks by the Germans. In some cases agents were caught in possession of their inks, in other cases the inks turned out not to be proof against the type of chemical testing done by Censorship, and almost without exception the liquid inks were difficult to apply, particularly from the standpoint of restoration. Results were frequently bad, in spite of careful training of the agent.

With the development of methods of secret writing with solid inks many of the liquid methods were apparently abandoned. Early in 1943 agents were equipped with types of S/W matches, well known to Censorship, which made use of such substances []

b3 Per CIA

the active ingredient. In some cases the active material was simply fuse on the end of a stick to give a small "match head", while in other cases it was mixed with a pliable inert material and molded on the end of the stick. The evidence indicates that since about June 1943 these solid materials are no longer being issued in the form of matches, but as small pellets which are easier to conceal. A pellet is prepared for writing by being placed in the base of a steel nib and warmed over a candle until it becomes soft and pliable. It is then made to adhere to the end of a matchstick, toothpick, or to the pointed end of a penholder and is ready for use. The writing must be applied evenly and without pressure, since the slightest pressure leaves shiny marks upon the surface of the paper. Agents have been instructed to assure themselves that there are no such traces by holding the paper against the light. No aftertreatment is required.

b7E

All of these methods are, of course, surpassed in degree of security by the more recent methods involving solid transfer and differential writing, described in recent technical notes. As already pointed out, these methods involve either one of two principles.

- 1) Incorporation of the S/W agent in the visible ink, writing the secret message en clair, and [] which is used for the cover letter.

b3 Per CIA
b7E

- 2) Incorporation of the S/W agent in the visible ink or (typing and the use of this "active" ink for writing certain words of the visible text, which, when developed, will reveal the secret message.

Another recent development in S/W involves certain refinements of the A.C. technique. Although the information available is fragmentary and not entirely clear, there appears to be cause for concern both in regard to the volume of A.C. testing now being done and in the conditions of exposure and development. Work is progressing along this line and as soon as more definite information is available it will be reported to you.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4. Photographic types of concealment

a. Microfilm

The evidence is clear that the individuals and equipment for the production of microdots are still at large and can be expected to continue actively their operations.

b. As mentioned before, the use of other types of photographic concealment such as latent images, double emulsion, etc. is still a threat.

b3 Per CIA
b7E

There is little new information available on the type of cover letter to be regarded as suspicious. The following two small bits of information may be of some use in selecting letters for testing.

1. In one case the code word "EVA" was to be used to indicate the type of writing already described as chloride transfer writing.
2. In another case an agent was told to write the visible text of his letters in ink on both sides of the sheet, but to place the writing on the back at right angles to that on the front.

It is obvious that there are several things we must do in order to improve the effectiveness of our coverage for the methods just described. Briefly, these things should take the following form:

1. Institution of measures to cover the possibilities of dry transfer and differential writing.

A certain amount of assistance in this direction has already been issued to you, and more will be forthcoming. It is essential that this information be put to immediate use, and just as important that field station chemists report through the regular weekly journal or special letter the

- 5 -
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

measures which have been taken and any ideas for improvement in organization and technique that have been worked out. Many helpful suggestions on new approaches and new ideas have originated in our field laboratories, and each chemist is urged to express his ideas freely to TOD.

2. Improvement in quality of testing.

As pointed out in TOB/75 this new information indicates that extreme care must be taken in testing and that the testers must be fully aware of all of the implications involved in the new techniques if we are to be successful in making interceptions. The importance of thoroughly investigating every possible suspicious indication cannot be overemphasized. It is fatal to allow ourselves to get into the frame of mind where we are not actively expecting positive results and where we disregard vague indications as of too indefinite suspicion.

3. Review of A. C. testing methods.

In view of the fact that the evidence just reported indicates a rather high level of importance attached to the A. C. technique it is imperative that we reexamine our position with respect to this type of testing. In all likelihood the intensity will have to be increased and additional thought given to the problem of volume testing. It is requested that each chemist review the facilities available for A. C. testing in his own particular laboratory and submit a report to the Chief, Laboratory Section, TOD, which will include the following items:

- a. Average number of daily examiner hours now spent in A. C. testing.
- b. Maximum number of examiner hours that could be spent in such testing if available space were used to full capacity.
- c. Brief outline of routine of testing letters for A. C. writing, including method of identifying letters, method of preparing strips, making exposure, etc.

From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the additional and more specialized examination of each piece of mail which we are forced to

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

perform because of the increased skill of the enemy, will have a marked tendency to shift the point of equilibrium between quality and quantity. The result will be an increased emphasis on quality of testing with a gradual de-emphasis on quantity of mail tested. This does not mean, however, that production will be of no consequence but rather that a new norm must be found. Trial and experience will be the basis upon which the norm will be determined.

Several points should be considered during the period of reorientation and they are listed below:

1. It is essential that the minor testers become more experienced in the application of a greater variety of test reagents, that they understand to the best of their ability what is involved in the reaction, and the limitation of the reagents, i.e., what to expect of the reagent under various conditions with an understanding of the degree of interpretation required. The TOD laboratory is working on a Job Training program that will assist the field chemists in the task of improving the efficiency of the minor testers.
2. Intensive selection of suspicious mail with more testing time devoted to the letters selected. Selection will be based to a large extent upon established criteria, supplemented by current information. It will be advisable to extend the presently limited practice of passing certain categories of mail with little or no chemical testing. Such categories might well include the following, although there will undoubtedly be other categories peculiar to various stations:
 - a. Mail to and from reputable business houses and their branch offices.
 - b. Easily recognizable family correspondence which has been previously tested with negative results.
 - c. Labor camp mail.
3. All communications selected on the basis of set-up and general suspicion can be broken down into two categories as at present:
 - a. Advanced testing.
 - b. Major testing (this to include watch list communications).

~~SECRET~~

TOB/78

~~SECRET~~

The communications selected for so-called advanced testing should be tested by the present minor testers but with greater skill and thoroughness. If the communication falls in the channels requiring removable reagents, then all available removable reagents should be used on the letter and on the inside of the envelope. If the communication falls in the irremovable striping channels, all reagents presently used in the multiple striping apparatus should be used on the letter and on the inside of the envelope. Chemical striping should be preceded by A. C. testing on the letter and inside the envelope. To permit more careful application of stripes and greater time for observation it may be advisable in certain cases to abandon the multiple striper in favor of hand striping. This may be particularly necessary until a faster reagent than K is developed to detect the type of writing described in Technical Notes #4.

Those communications selected for major testing (including watch list letters) should receive particular attention and be tested as thoroughly as our present procedures permit. This will include complete A. C. treatment, complete duffing, complete testing of letter and envelope with the regular major reagents, as well as special and supplementary reagents as the situation dictates.

It must be borne in mind that the points suggested, though of considerable importance, are not the entire story and that practical application and field experience must and will contribute to the guidance of the entire plan of operation. Field chemists and postal SSA's are encouraged to suggest any points that may be generally applicable to all stations.

- 8 -

~~SECRET~~

THE FOLLOWING IS RESTRICTED TO SSD PERSONNEL.

EHNI CASE - Supplementary Report.

In the Introductory Report on the Ehni Case (TOB/58), TOD requested that the correspondence of the individuals connected with the case be studied to determine whether they were involved in joint, directed activities of a subversive nature, or whether the vague statements in their communications were intended merely to conceal their private affairs from the censor.

Three channels of communication were involved: (1) Ruth Bruning, Ilse Adrian and Fred Sander in Peru, to Kurt Bruning and Kurt Adrian, interned in the United States; (2) Fred Sander in Peru and Inga Illies and Anita Kuhrig-Nef in Panama, to Hans Joachim Illies (and others), also interned in the United States; and (3) "Charlie" in Peru and "Federico" in Mexico, who correspond with Ella Meier Ehni and Ella Bertschi in Switzerland.

In TOB/59 and 67 TOD reported the deaths of three principals in the case: Fred Sander, Carlos Sutorius, and "don Enrique". (The latter two are now believed to be identical). The Ehni Case had been in progress for only a very short time, when it was learned that Ilse Adrian had succeeded in coming to the United States to join her husband (case card #83). Supplementary information on GNY 297304 (14) reveals that Kurt Bruning sailed for Germany on Jan. 6, 1945, via the Gripsholm. There have been no intercepts from Ruth Bruning in Peru to the Sanders in the United States; to all intents and purposes, the Peru-U. S. channel no longer exists in this case.

The Panama-U. S. channel continues to produce a large volume of traffic all of which, however, appears to be innocuous. Although it was reported that Anita Kuhrig-Nef was receiving a pension from the German government in acknowledgement of her husband's services, she writes that she has divorced him (case cards 93, 94). Even if this statement was made merely for the edification of the censors, the fact is that Miss Nef has never revealed anything of security interest in her communications. Mrs. Illies, whose background is equally suspicious, confines the subject matter of her correspondence to family and anthroposophic affairs. She has also been making an effort to join her husband in the United States (case cards 63, 79).

A recent intercept (NY 393355) from Dr. Oscar Meyer, 6371 Florio Street, Oakland 11, California, to Ella Ehni, revealed that the writer had recently published a book called "Von Bismarck zu Hitler", a mixture of autobiography and history, in which he mentions addressee. Writer was Secretary of State in Germany during the Weimar Republic (c. Wer Ists, 1928), and is now a political refugee here. Mention of Ella Ehni occurs on page 202, where the author describes his exit from Germany to Switzerland. Dr. Meyer says that he met Ella Ehni while he was staying in Switzerland. She is

TOB/78

~~SECRET~~

American born, and re-acquired U. S. citizenship after the death of her husband. She formerly lived in Stuttgart, where she was a Representative in the Wurttemberg Government. She has lived in Switzerland for many years. Dr. Meyer remarks that she has a wide field of interests, and that he often sought her advice. In both the book and his letter to her, he acknowledges her many kindnesses to his wife and himself.

This description of Ella Ehni as the friend of an anti-Nazi is incompatible with her apparent continued interest in a Proclaimed Listed firm (case cards 6, 92, and BWTL). It may be pointed out that Ella Ehni has apparently been supplanted in G. Ehni & Co. by one Ella Bertschi; but circumstantial evidence suggests that these two are one and the same person. Letters from each have been written in the same handwriting (NY 395039 and NY 389628). Both correspond with Frederick Zinke in Mexico and Carlos Wagner in Peru. Both have mentioned visiting in Engadine during the same period (case cards 76, 78). However, neither has ever been mentioned as a third party in the correspondence of the other.

For these reasons, Ella Ehni and Ella Bertschi are being retained on the U. S. Censorship Watch List, while all the other case connections are being deleted. Ricardo Kreft (Adrian correspondence) continues to be of security interest as shown by his present listing as Bestj 1000, 4601.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DJP:EH

TO : MR. E. P. COFFEY *Sk*

DATE: February 17, 1945

FROM : MR. D. J. PARSONS

SUBJECT:

RE: *X* VALUE OF USED ENVELOPES
AS INVESTIGATIVE AIDS

Reference is made to Mr. Penny's memorandum of February 5, 1945, to Mr. Ladd referring to the possibility of the transfer of a written message from the paper to the inside of the containing envelope. He pointed out that as a result of trash coverage it may be possible to ascertain the contents of a letter from an examination of the envelope even though the letter itself may be missing.

Although we do not consider the possibilities very good here we would obviously accept requests for such an examination from the field and would do our very best to develop any invisible writing that may have been transferred from the contents. One of the principal influencing factors would be the manner in which the letter within the envelope was folded and whether a sufficient amount of the message was in contact with the envelope to permit transfer. Also, most typewriting and some types of ink do not effectively transfer constituents to other paper.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that if the Security and Investigative Divisions consider this of sufficient importance they advise the field of this possibility, and that this type of material be submitted to the Laboratory for examination in an effort to aid the field in this problem.

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Coffey	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Mumford	
Mr. Jones	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Beahm	
Miss Gandy	

RECORDED & INDEXED

MAR 27 1945

57 APR 12 1945

OFFICE OF LEGAL ATTACHE
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LIMA, PERU

March 20, 1945

~~PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director, FBI

Attention TECHNICAL LABORATORY

Re: PURCHASE OF LOCALLY MANUFACTURED
TAICUM POWDER

Dear Sir:

Secret Writing

Reference is made to a letter from the Bureau dated November 21, 1944, requesting the purchase and transmittal of several cans of after-shaving powder manufactured in Peru.

This is to advise that no such products are available here, all brands of men's powder being imported from the United States or Great Britain. There are many brands of Peruvian made powder for women but it is considered that these are not satisfactory for the laboratory's needs.

Very truly yours

Charles E. McNabb

CHARLES E. McNABB
L.A.

kg

172
DK
78 APR 7 1945

RECORDED
80 &
INDEXED

R
180-604-349
APR 3 1945

COPY: FQ

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

RHC:AWK

March 26, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. COFFEY

Re: Security Matter; Furnishing of
Invisible Marking Ink.

This memorandum serves to record progress to date on the above problem as outlined to Mr. Chambers by Supervisor Lish Whitson, which is as follows:

A secret marking medium is desired which can be used effectively to place invisible markings on documentary material which may be later used as evidence. It is necessary that the marking media be adaptable to any kind of paper without leaving any significant visible marks thereon. It should be of such a nature that several men can initial several thousand documents in a relatively short time and have a permanent record left on these documents which will be instantaneously visible under the ultraviolet light, such as the portable units presently in the field offices. It was suggested that an invisible marking liquid in fountain pens would be adaptable.

The following methods were worked out and presented to Inspector Gurnea.

b3 Per CIA
b7E

1. Fountain pen method. The liquid used in the fountain pen is composed of a 5% solution of [redacted] in a solvent containing 80 cc water, 20 cc ethyl alcohol, and 5 cc ethylene glycol. This ink flows readily and dries rapidly, leaving only the faintest of visible marks when care is taken to write lightly enough with the pen not to indent the paper. Certain types of "slick" papers and photographs do not take the liquid ink well.
2. The following method was devised especially for the requirement of initialling many documents of various types of paper, with a minimum of lost motion. A lead is prepared which consists of equal parts of [redacted] with a very small quantity of added paraffin. The "lead" is made of such size as to fit the commercial mechanical wax marking pencil, being about 1/8" in diameter. This lead is somewhat fragile, owing to the physical characteristics which must be present to provide a fluorescent marking medium which does not produce visible marks, indentations or scratches on the document. As in the pen method, every slight stroke is required to avoid producing visible scratches or indentations.

b3 Per CIA
b7E

RECORDED

180-604-349X
F B I
71 MAY 14 1947

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-267360-60

*0 Detection and Production of Secret, Invisible and Synthetic
Ink and Marking, including invisible marking for Perforated money.*

At Inspector Gurnea's request, 12 units each of the pen and pencil methods have been obtained and furnished, with the exception of one pencil which was found to be mechanically defective. Three of each of these methods were forwarded air express to Assistant Special Agent in Charge Donegan on Saturday afternoon, March 24, 1945, together with extra leads.

It was suggested to Mr. Whitson that instructions be given to the group of Agents who will perform the marking with these tools or that Mr. Chambers be present to assist in the marking. It is pointed out that these marking materials are capable of permanent visible development if such is desired.

Extra ink and leads are available in the laboratory. It is suggested that the laboratory be advised at the earliest possible date, however, if more pens or pencils are desired, due to the difficulty of obtaining these items.

Respectfully,

T. F. Baughman

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

RHC:AF
80-604

TO : MR. COFFEY *[Signature]*
FROM : T. F. BAUGHMAN *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: SECRET INK RESEARCH

DATE: March 15, 1945

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Beahm _____
Miss Gandy _____

This memorandum reflects the cumulative results of secret ink experiments carried out over a period covering approximately the past 60 days. The majority of this work has been done in connection with current cases.

Testing for [] which might be utilized as secret ink mab3 Per CIA it was found that the ideal concentration of hydrochloric acid to be used with b7E e curcuma solution is 10%. With this concentration, the most rapid development was obtained with the widest range of concentrations of [] ink material, utilizing [] as the reference material.

[] previously found to be satisfactory as secrb3 Per CIA materials for situations where the ink will be developed a few days after writb7E with it, were found to disappear completely upon standing for a period exceeding four months. [] research done recently in connection with the COLEPAUGH-GIMPEL case indicates that [] may be the compound added to the ink rendering it active under the conditions of its use. It has been found that molecule for molecule, [] is considerably more effective than [] as an added material in this secret ink method. Tests already in routine use serve to detect this secret ink method.

b3 Per CIA
b7E

Progress has been made on the search for a removable testing solution capable of developing []

a solution is obtained which can be cleaned off the paper providing it is done within 5 or 10 minutes after application. There is some tendency for the color to come back over a period of time. The cleaning solution found to be best consists of a 20 or 25% hypo solution containing a few drops of hydrochloric acid. The "scrambling solution" of the National Censorship Laboratory will produce comparable results to the acid hypo.

Contrary to a PQZ report [] it was found that [] will not serve as a developer for lemon juice secret ink.

b3 Per CIA
b7E

The "scrambling solution" presently used by Censorship to remove and disguise the identity of their testing stripes has been found to interfere completely with the development [] method on the other hand, is not appreciably affected by the testing for scrambling solutions.

For the development of [] secret writing, an alcoholic solution of

RECORDED

80-604-358

EX-37

APR 5 1945

78 APR 7 1945

[]

7-20

[]

[redacted] has been found to be very satisfactory, avoiding the smearing which results from ordinary aqueous acids.

The secret ink information file and index system has proved to be a very valuable tool in the Secret Ink Unit, saving a great deal of time and making possible the handling of all examinations in a more logical manner. It was notably of valuable assistance in the handling of the recent COLEPAUGH-GIMPTEL espionage case. Many of the possibilities of this cross-indexing have not yet been realized, particularly in connection with research in technical and investigative matters.

OFFICE OF THE CIVIL ATTACHÉ
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MEXICO CITY

March 22, 1945

Director, FBI

RE: ~~TALCUM POWDER~~

Dear Sir:

In accordance with your request of March 5th, 1945, there are being forwarded under separate cover seventy-five cans of assorted brands of talcum powder suitable for men's use.

It is noted that in the referenced letter it was suggested that talcum powder manufactured in other countries might be more satisfactory. However, for your information, all of the talcum powder suitable for men's use and sold in Mexico is manufactured in this country.

Very truly yours,

Robert W. Wall, Jr.
ROBERT W. WALL, Jr.
CA

cc: Package

RECORDED & INDEXED
137

EX - 50

80-604-351
32 MAR 28 1945

74 APR 12 1945

422



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

April 5, 1945

RHC:AWK
80-604

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. COFFEY

Re: Secret Ink Research

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Acers _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Starke _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Beahm _____

This memorandum concerns the research done in the past month on current cases and offensive methods.

Continuing the work on [redacted] which seems to be presently a secret ink material of choice for the German Espionage System, it was found that messages prepared according to the German directions could withstand removable striping and the "scrambling solution" of Censorship, providing care is taken to apply a minimum amount of these reagents. Miss Gab3 Per CIA b7E

Similarly, [redacted] is of current interest. It was found that [redacted] with the addition of 1% acetic acid would detect this type of writing without producing the darkening of background characteristics of developers. A spray application is sufficient. [redacted]

b3 Per CIA
b7E

It was found that writing prepared with lemon juice or citric acid solution could have the presence of the citric acid demonstrated by microchemical tests on the extract from one word of the message.

RECORDED & INDEXED 80-604-352

In connection with the Philip Parker case, in which a principal subject has not been identified, it was found that a [redacted] in possession of a suspect was capable of developing the ink formula of another subject of investigation in connection with this case, the formula containing [redacted] b3 Per CIA b7E

Stimulated by recent developments in connection with differential methods, considerable research was conducted to find additive materials for ordinary ink which would be capable of giving the type of transfer utilized in the recent Colepaugh-Gimpel case. It is desired that the additive material not be revealed by any tests presently being used. Preliminary tests were carried out by determination on paper of the sensitivity of various materials under microchemical spot-testing conditions. After the unsatisfactory materials were eliminated and the satisfactory ones had a workable concentration established for them, a quantity would be added to each of several ordinary fountain pen inks, [redacted]

b3 Per CIA
b7E



57 APR 18 1945

substances have been tested to date:

b3 Per CIA
b7E

<u>Substance</u>	<u>Developer</u>	<u>Results</u>
		Lacks sensitivity
		Negative on transfer
		Negative on transfer
		Slight Traces after transfer
		Negligible to date; work continuing

Extensive research has been carried out on the photosensitizing of photographic emulsions without the effect of light. This research has two objectives, namely, to determine if possible the type of material being employed by the Germans which is capable of development on dry transfer to photographic paper and subsequent development without the influence of light and also to develop an offensive material which will be even simpler and more secure than methods now in use by the Bureau. Because of the extensive nature of this research the detailed steps in this development to date are not being set out herein, but will be reported as a separate research upon completion. This problem has been approached by first making an extensive search of the literature and organizing the work to carry on from that which has previously been done in connection with the hydrogen peroxide theory of photo sensitivity. It has been found possible to make a secret message in the following fashion. A sheet of paper is brushed with a very dilute solution of rosin or linseed oil or other active unsaturated fatty material, utilizing such a small amount that its presence is not betrayed by any taste, feel or smell. A message is prepared by writing on a transparent material such as cellophane with an opaque ink such as Higgin's India Ink. The India ink writing is placed upon the sheet of treated paper and exposed to the sunlight so that the India ink writing is between the paper and the sunlight, for a period of about 5 minutes. The hydrogen peroxide produced by the catalysis of the breakdown of the oils in the paper is then detected in the form of readable writing by placing the paper in close contact with a photographic film of the unsensitized variety, such as ordinary commercial film. After about 18 hours' contact a satisfactory latent image is produced on the film which is capable of development. At no time does light enter into the process. The only problem which appears to remain at the present time in connection with this system is to eliminate the possibility of fluorescence of the oils in the paper probably by selection of a material which does not change in its fluorescent quality upon exposure to ultraviolet. The same results can be secured with an ordinary ultraviolet source, either filtered or unfiltered.

Respectfully,

T. F. Baughman
T. F. Baughman

80-604-354

ENCLOSURE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

FROM : Mr. S. S. *[initials]*

SUBJECT: SECRET INK - "FACILITATED" MESSAGES

DATE: 3/17/45
WJP:edm

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Jones _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Beahm _____
Miss Gandy _____

Reference is made to Mr. T. F. Baughman's memorandum to Mr. Coffey dated March 5, 1945, relative to a problem which has arisen on secret ink writings of certain of the German espionage agents who are controlled by the Bureau. The referenced memorandum set out that none of the secret ink methods being used by controlled agents can pass through U.S. Censorship undetected under the present Censorship campaign of thoroughly testing all outgoing mail to drop countries.

As you know, these letters are being facilitated through the Office of Censorship to assure delivery to the addressee, and since Censorship's policy of stripping communications to the drop countries was put into effect, the Bureau Laboratory has been applying the Censorship stripping tests to give assurance to the addressee that his mail is not being given extraordinary attention. In applying the stripping, Mr. Baughman sets out in the referenced memorandum that it would be necessary to omit one or more of the testing stripes to avoid bringing up the secret ink which the agent was instructed to use, and it was observed by Mr. Baughman that the immediate problem would be solved should Censorship begin to subject less of this mail to the bulk examination by means of stripping.

The new policy of more selective examination was suggested in Censorship's TOD Bulletin Number 75 dated February 10, 1945. Mr. W. J. Powell of this Section ascertained from Dr. Pierce, Chief Chemist, U. S. Censorship, that this policy of not subjecting 100% of the mail going to drop countries to the major tests of stripping is being put into effect and for all intents and purposes is on the way. Therefore the Bureau's handicap seems to have been lifted in that it appears that the Laboratory may now desist from using the multiple stripes on all messages being facilitated and will be in a position to release the letter in a clean condition without fear of the addressee knowing that the agent operating has been compromised. Pierce also related that there is no method wherein he could give figures as to just how much of the mail to drop countries will be subjected to major stripping tests; however, he stated that at the present time about 50% to 70% is probably being so tested and that this number will be reduced as time goes on and that more selectivity will be used in the major tests.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this memorandum be forwarded to the Laboratory for its information as well as to the Espionage Section.

*Let's nyc 4-11-45
in cam case
JSP*

557

RECAP 4-11-45

RECORDED

180-604-
31 APR 18 1945

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

March 5, 1945

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey *act* _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd *✓* _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Piper _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Beahm _____

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. COFFEY *OK*

Re: Secret Ink - "Facilitated" Messages

BACKGROUND:

This memorandum pertains to facilitation through Censorship of secret ink writings of certain of the German espionage agents who are being controlled or being considered for control by the Bureau. By some coincidence, none of these secret ink methods can pass through U. S. Censorship undetected under the present Censorship campaign of thoroughly testing all the outgoing mail to drop countries. Examples of the methods and cases involved are as follows:

<u>METHOD</u>	<u>CASE</u>

b3 Per CIA
b7E

b3 Per CIA
b7E

In each of the above cases it would be necessary to omit one or more of the testing stripes to avoid bringing up the secret ink message permanently. It is necessary to stripe the specimens, however, in order to maintain uniformity in appearance between them and all other mail going to drop countries. It is also observed that [redacted] and indelible pencil (Cocase [redacted]) secret ink writing will be destroyed by the application of "scrambling solution" such as U. S. Censorship uses for final treatment of all mail to drop countries.

In U. S. Censorship TOR-bulletin #75 dated February 10, 1945 attached to Mr. Alden's memorandum for Mr. Ladd dated February 16, 1945 it is stated (Paragraph 2, Page 2) that the results to date of the testing campaign referred



59 APR 24 1945

RECORDED

EX - 28

(Cont'd on Next Page)

180-604-356

APR 13 1945

to herein before were negative. It was further anticipated (recommendation #2, page 4) that the principal of using this irremovable testing should be retained, with more selective choosing of test specimens in the future.

OBSERVATIONS:

Because of Censorship's policy of stiping and "scrambling" all mail to drop countries, the Bureau is handicapped in facilitating secret ink messages through Censorship in a logical fashion. It appears that the immediate problem may be solved should Censorship begin soon to let some mail through without complete treatment; that they intend to do so is not clear in the reference bulletin. It seems significant that none of the systems enumerated in this memorandum are new even though many better, newer methods are known to exist, some of which could undoubtedly pass through Censorship's screen undetected.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this memorandum be forwarded to the Security Division for the information of the Espionage Section and for clarification by the Liaison Section of future Censorship policy concerning irremovable testing on mail to drop countries.

Respectfully,

T. F. Baughman
T. F. Baughman

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COUNTER

TO: Mr. Robert W. Wall
The American Embassy
Mexico, D. F.

FROM: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Talcum powder

It is requested that your office secure and forward to the Bureau approximately seventy-five cans of assorted brands of men's talcum powder. These cans should be of the type having friction or glued tops rather than crimped tops, and tin cans are, of course, preferable. It is also desired that the containers be of small size. It is not necessary for the talcum powder to have been manufactured locally, and as a matter of fact, the type manufactured in other countries, imported and sold locally, is more satisfactory.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Legal Attache in Rio de Janeiro in order that this request may be duplicated in that city.

cc Mr. Sam E. Papich
Mr. American Embassy
MAR 8 1945
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

RECORDED

100-607-256A
EX-13
30 MAR 10 1945



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

April 11, 1945

RHC:AWK
80-604
cc-62-62736

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. COFFEY

Re: Laboratory Censorship Contacts -
Monthly Report.

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Acers _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Starke _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Beahm _____
Miss Gandy _____

The only meeting between representatives of Censorship's Laboratory and the FBI Laboratory took place at Censorship, when Messrs. Magee and Chambers were invited over by Dr. Pierce.

Dr. Pierce was anxious to discuss their approach to the problems of censorship posed by the discovery of new secret ink methods, such as that of the Colepaugh-Gimpel case, and others. This matter and other laboratory problems of a mutual nature were discussed.

Respectfully,

T. F. Baughman

T. F. Baughman

RECORDED

80-604-357

EX-24 31 APR 16 1945



APR 29 1945

OFFICE OF THE CIVIL ATTACHÉ
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MEXICO CITY

April 6, 1945

to
Director, FBI

RE: TALCUM POWDER

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to the letter from this office dated March 22, 1945, advising that in accordance with Bureau request seventy-five cans of assorted brands of talcum powder were being forwarded under separate cover.

You are advised that the above powder was shipped to the Bureau via rail pouch on April 6, 1945.

Very truly yours,

Robert W. Wall, Jr.
ROBERT W. WALL, JR.
Civil Attache

Secret

*powder
recd in lab
4-17-45*

APR 10 1945
RECORDED

ha
80-604-358

APR 20 1945

SEVEN
SPEC

52 APR 27 1945
357

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON-25, D.C.

12-1409-6

11 April 1945

ENR COFFEY
173 Bingham

Memorandum for: Mr. C. Darwin Marron

Subject: Secret Writing Formula

The following is transmitted for your information:

Materials to be secured at any drugstore. For correspondence buy a [redacted] capsule, dissolve it in a coffee- spoonful of 90% alcohol. If 90% is not available, use 45%, dip the whole paper in alcohol, dry, press, rub off. Write on unused portion of ordinary letter with a sharpened point of wood wrapped in cotton. This means is known by Allies. b3 Per CIA b7E

To develop: Dissolve [redacted] to the saturation point in water. Rub paper with the solution.

For correspondence with Germany: Dissolve a piece of [redacted] in water, clarify the solution with 35-40 drops of ammonia, wash the paper. Means not known by the Allies according to the Germans. b3 Per CIA b7E

nothing new
MM 4/19/45

J. George Gately
J. George Gately
X-2 Branch

RECORDED
&
INDEXED
155

80-604-359

EJH

78 APR 30 1945 357

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

L2-1409-5

29 March 1945

Memorandum for: Mr. John F. Doherty

Subject: O Secret Writing

The following information concerning S/W may be of interest to your office. It was furnished by a German agent who had been instructed in this method of transmitting messages:

Source used a small amount of pyramidon powder in a bit of alcohol and wrote with the use of a special match which had a small piece of wool on the end. His messages were written lengthwise in capital letters on the back of ordinary love letters. If source had no pyramidon powder, he was instructed to write his messages with a pencil of

b3 Per CIA
b7E

nothing new here
JWM
4/26/45
EX-4
80-604-360
21 MAY 1 1945
Swan
50 MAY 21 1945
357
Q
~~SECRET~~

J. George Gately
J. George Gately
X-2 Branch

a
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
April 24, 1945

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COURIER

Director, FBI

RE: TALCUM POWDER

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your letter of March 5, 1945, to the Mexico City Office, copy of which was received here, requesting that we obtain seventy-five cans of assorted brands of men's talcum powder. In accordance with that request, there are being shipped via steamer pouch the following specimens of talcum powder obtained to-date:

8	cans Dagelle Talcum (Made in Brazil)
10	cans Mennens Talcum (Made in Brazil)
3	cans Williams Talcum (Made in Brazil)
2	cans Coty's Talcum (Made in Brazil)
1	can Palmolive Talcum (Made in Brazil)
7	cans Yardley's Talcum (Imported)
<u>31</u>	

As soon as other cans of talcum powder become available they will be shipped to the Bureau.

Very truly yours,

Heber M. Clegg
HEBER M. CLEGG
L. A.

HMC:LH
94-0

0 Secret Ink
78 MAY 5 1945 357

180-604
NOT RECORDED
21 MAY 4 1945
7-R/K
S/S
MA

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TADD

FROM : S. S. Alden

SUBJECT:

DATE: 4/28/45
SWR: mkm

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

A request has been received by Special Agent S. W. Reynolds of the Liaison Section, from Lieut. Colonel Frank Cottey, Military Intelligence Service, for an appointment for Colonel J. W. Coulter, MIS, to discuss secret ink with one of the Bureau experts. Colonel Cottey indicated that General Bissell had requested Colonel Coulter to take this action and Colonel Coulter had requested Colonel Cottey to make the necessary arrangements. Colonel Cottey indicated that there is apparently a great deal of urgency in connection with this matter and requested that an appointment be made for some time on Tuesday, May 1, 1945.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that permission be granted to Colonel Coulter, and that the Liaison Section be advised as to the identity of the individual whom Colonel Coulter will see, and the appropriate time.

70° in Cannonville
in the Copper Lake

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

47

37

80-60
F
21

50 MAY 19 1945

they to make the
here is apparently
and requested that an
5,
Colonel Coulter, and that
individual whom Colonel
2-60
10-60
11-60
12-60
1-61
2-61
3-61
4-61
5-61
6-61
7-61
8-61
9-61
10-61
11-61
12-61
1-62
2-62
3-62
4-62
5-62
6-62
7-62
8-62
9-62
10-62
11-62
12-62
1-63
2-63
3-63
4-63
5-63
6-63
7-63
8-63
9-63
10-63
11-63
12-63
1-64
2-64
3-64
4-64
5-64
6-64
7-64
8-64
9-64
10-64
11-64
12-64
1-65
2-65
3-65
4-65
5-65
6-65
7-65
8-65
9-65
10-65
11-65
12-65
1-66
2-66
3-66
4-66
5-66
6-66
7-66
8-66
9-66
10-66
11-66
12-66
1-67
2-67
3-67
4-67
5-67
6-67
7-67
8-67
9-67
10-67
11-67
12-67
1-68
2-68
3-68
4-68
5-68
6-68
7-68
8-68
9-68
10-68
11-68
12-68
1-69
2-69
3-69
4-69
5-69
6-69
7-69
8-69
9-69
10-69
11-69
12-69
1-70
2-70
3-70
4-70
5-70
6-70
7-70
8-70
9-70
10-70
11-70
12-70
1-71
2-71
3-71
4-71
5-71
6-71
7-71
8-71
9-71
10-71
11-71
12-71
1-72
2-72
3-72
4-72
5-72
6-72
7-72
8-72
9-72
10-72
11-72
12-72
1-73
2-73
3-73
4-73
5-73
6-73
7-73
8-73
9-73
10-73
11-73
12-73
1-74
2-74
3-74
4-74
5-74
6-74
7-74
8-74
9-74
10-74
11-74
12-74
1-75
2-75
3-75
4-75
5-75
6-75
7-75
8-75
9-75
10-75
11-75
12-75
1-76
2-76
3-76
4-76
5-76
6-76
7-76
8-76
9-76
10-76
11-76
12-76
1-77
2-77
3-77
4-77
5-77
6-77
7-77
8-77
9-77
10-77
11-77
12-77
1-78
2-78
3-78
4-78
5-78
6-78
7-78
8-78
9-78
10-78
11-78
12-78
1-79
2-79
3-79
4-79
5-79
6-79
7-79
8-79
9-79
10-79
11-79
12-79
1-80
2-80
3-80
4-80
5-80
6-80
7-80
8-80
9-80
10-80
11-80
12-80
1-81
2-81
3-81
4-81
5-81
6-81
7-81
8-81
9-81
10-81
11-81
12-81
1-82
2-82
3-82
4-82
5-82
6-82
7-82
8-82
9-82
10-82
11-82
12-82
1-83
2-83
3-83
4-83
5-83
6-83
7-83
8-83
9-83
10-83
11-83
12-83
1-84
2-84
3-84
4-84
5-84
6-84
7-84
8-84
9-84
10-84
11-84
12-84
1-85
2-85
3-85
4-85
5-85
6-85
7-85
8-85
9-85
10-85
11-85
12-85
1-86
2-86
3-86
4-86
5-86
6-86
7-86
8-86
9-86
10-86
11-86
12-86
1-87
2-87
3-87
4-87
5-87
6-87
7-87
8-87
9-87
10-87
11-87
12-87
1-88
2-88
3-88
4-88
5-88
6-88
7-88
8-88
9-88
10-88
11-88
12-88
1-89
2-89
3-89
4-89
5-89
6-89
7-89
8-89
9-89
10-89
11-89
12-89
1-90
2-90
3-90
4-90
5-90
6-90
7-90
8-90
9-90
10-90
11-90
12-90
1-91
2-91
3-91
4-91
5-91
6-91
7-91
8-91
9-91
10-91
11-91
12-91
1-92
2-92
3-92
4-92
5-92
6-92
7-92
8-92
9-92
10-92
11-92
12-92
1-93
2-93
3-93
4-93
5-93
6-93
7-93
8-93
9-93
10-93
11-93
12-93
1-94
2-94
3-94
4-94
5-94
6-94
7-94
8-94
9-94
10-94
11-94
12-94
1-95
2-95
3-95
4-95
5-95
6-95
7-95
8-95
9-95
10-95
11-95
12-95
1-96
2-96
3-96
4-96
5-96
6-96
7-96
8-96
9-96
10-96
11-96
12-96
1-97
2-97
3-97
4-97
5-97
6-97
7-97
8-97
9-97
10-97
11-97
12-97
1-98
2-98
3-98
4-98
5-98
6-98
7-98
8-98
9-98
10-98
11-98
12-98
1-99
2-99
3-99
4-99
5-99
6-99
7-99
8-99
9-99
10-99
11-99
12-99
1-00
2-00
3-00
4-00
5-00
6-00
7-00
8-00
9-00
10-00
11-00
12-00
1-01
2-01
3-01
4-01
5-01
6-01
7-01
8-01
9-01
10-01
11-01
12-01
1-02
2-02
3-02
4-02
5-02
6-02
7-02
8-02
9-02
10-02
11-02
12-02
1-03
2-03
3-03
4-03
5-03
6-03
7-03
8-03
9-03
10-03
11-03
12-03
1-04
2-04
3-04
4-04
5-04
6-04
7-04
8-04
9-04
10-04
11-04
12-04
1-05
2-05
3-05
4-05
5-05
6-05
7-05
8-05
9-05
10-05
11-05
12-05
1-06
2-06
3-06
4-06
5-06
6-06
7-06
8-06
9-06
10-06
11-06
12-06
1-07
2-07
3-07
4-07
5-07
6-07
7-07
8-07
9-07
10-07
11-07
12-07
1-08
2-08
3-08
4-08
5-08
6-08
7-08
8-08
9-08
10-08
11-08
12-08
1-09
2-09
3-09
4-09
5-09
6-09
7-09
8-09
9-09
10-09
11-09
12-09
1-10
2-10
3-10
4-10
5-10
6-10
7-10
8-10
9-10
10-10
11-10
12-10
1-11
2-11
3-11
4-11
5-11
6-11
7-11
8-11
9-11
10-11
11-11
12-11
1-12
2-12
3-12
4-12
5-12
6-12
7-12
8-12
9-12
10-12
11-12
12-12
1-13
2-13
3-13
4-13
5-13
6-13
7-13
8-13
9-13
10-13
11-13
12-13
1-14
2-14
3-14
4-14
5-14
6-14
7-14
8-14
9-14
10-

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

THE OFFICE OF CENSORSHIP

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

May 8, 1945.

ge 80-604
Mr. John Edgar Hoover,
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Department of Justice,
Washington 25, D. C.

Image
Attention: Mr. McGee.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

We are enclosing one copy each of Supplements #12 and #13, for
addition to your copy of the Office of Censorship Secret Ink Manual.

Sincerely yours,

J. P. Wozniak
J. P. Wozniak,
Executive Liaison Officer.

*Returned in 7410
for copy
100-5925*
Enclosures
2, as above.
1 return receipt

56 MAY 14 1945

detached & placed in Censorship manual
Serial #362
~~SECRET~~

RECORDED

EX-59

80-604-362
31 MAY 10 1945

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

EPC:EH

TO : MR. E. A. TAMM

DATE: May 1, 1945

FROM : MR. E. P. COFFEY

SUBJECT: Secret Ink
German Censorship

Colonel John W. Coulter of G-2 was referred to me by Mr. Ladd.

The Colonel has been assigned a project which originated with the Office of Censorship. The project consists of preparing a summary on all methods and techniques used by the German Censorship. Colonel Coulter stated that he was covering all possible angles to this and that was the reason he came to the FBI.

I explained to the Colonel that we had a constant technical liaison with Censorship and that they had all our up-to-date information about German Censorship. I also explained to the Colonel the limitations of our work in regard to Censorship. I also arranged for Colonel Coulter to see our Secret Ink Laboratory.

The Colonel is of the opinion that he had gotten everything he needed and that he would put a paragraph in his summary report explaining how the FBI fitted into the picture.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Jones
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

57 MAY 17 1945

RECORDED
&
INDEXED180-604-363
30 MAY 4 194524
EX-23



RHC:AWK
80-604

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

May 9, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. COFFEY

Re: Secret Ink Research

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Acers _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Starke _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Beahm _____
Miss Gandy _____

This memorandum reports the results of research done during the past thirty days on current cases, offensive methods and laboratory procedure.

Applying the technique of the [redacted] system, it was found that a 1 to 1000 concentration [redacted] could be used as a secret ink which, when properly used, can be developed only by a tray immersion method. Development takes place [redacted]

b3 Per CIA
b7E

[redacted] Pending final trials, it is believed this new method can be used in a wider variety of cover materials and at the same time be even more secure than materials presently employed by SIS. As is true of all chemical reactions used in secret ink work, there is a counterpart for this method in the literature. On paper, however, a specially modified technique of reaction (development) is required, which was worked out in the laboratory and should be unknown to others.


b3 Per CIA
b7E

In handling a current submission of the ~~Sam~~case [redacted] it was found that the [redacted] used in this and other typical cases is slightly fluorescent with a cream-yellow color in the undeveloped state. This effect can be viewed only at close range with the aid of the "Mineralite" type of U. V. lamp.

b3 Per CIA
b7E

In connection with the ~~Comrap~~ case, it was found that [redacted] was not sensitive enough to reveal the final step employed in the Comrap method of secret ink writing, namely, the use of a very dilute bath of sodium hydroxide. It is contemplated that a more sensitive indicator will be found, however. This research may assume increasing importance, as it relates to a system furnished by the Russians for high security communications.

Research is currently under way in connection with the identification of the acid-sensitive [redacted] used as s/i developer in the Nascimento Case. Likewise, the analysis of iron inks is being studied for application in connection with cases typified by the Colpaugh-Gimpel case.



The procedures outlined in the Censorship Manual we have just received are being critically checked for anything of value which might be derived therefrom.

Respectfully,

T. F. Baughman

RECORDED

INDEXED

EX-38

180-604-364
32 MAY 1945

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : 80-604 RHC/mek
Mr. Coffey

DATE: May 12, 1945

FROM : Mr. Baughman

SUBJECT: Laboratory Censorship Contacts -
Monthly Report*Secret Ink*

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. E. A. Tamm	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Coffey	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Acers	_____
Mr. Carson	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Hendon	_____
Mr. Mumford	_____
Mr. Statke	_____
Mr. Quinn Tamm	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

The only meeting between representatives of Censorship's Laboratory and this Laboratory took place when Dr. Clifford Pierce came over from Censorship April 23, 1945 for the purpose of delivering a copy of their Secret Ink Technical Manual. The copy delivered bears the number 12.

Instead of being maintained in the Secret Ink Section, as was previously discussed, the Manual will be placed in the Secret Ink File, #80-604. Subsequent additions arriving from Censorship for this Manual will be added to the Manual. Supplements #12 and #13 were received today. It is anticipated that a meeting will be held in the near future for the purpose of discussing a few matters of interest to us and the Liaison Section.

56 MAY 19 1945
cc: 62-62736

RECORDED & INDEXED MAY 15 1945

120 EX - 58

SECRET

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

Washington, D. C.

April 28, 1945

JWM:AL

80-604

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. COFFEY *ELC*

Re: Visit of Dr. Pierce
Office of Censorship

On April 23, 1945, Dr. Pierce came over to the Laboratory at which time he brought one of their technical manuals and left it with Magee. Magee signed a receipt for this manual and the manual is being maintained in the Secret Ink Unit. *file, 80-604.*

Respectfully,

T. F. Baughman
T. F. Baughman



76 MAY 21 1945 *57*

CC-287a

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Acers _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Starke _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Beahm _____
Miss Gandy _____

RECORDED

80-604-366

MAY 15 1945

EX-4

1-ELC
[Signature]

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Serial 0904816



Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn
Miss Gandy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM for Mr. J. E. Hoover, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
(Attention: Liaison Section)

Subject: [redacted]

16 MAY 1945

b3 Per CIA
b7E

Reference is made to your communications dated
5 April 1945 and 7 May 1945, from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, con-
cerning the alleged projected use of [redacted] in secret
writing.

Review of material available in the Office of
Naval Intelligence files fails to disclose any informa-
tion pertinent to this matter.

Wallace S. Wharton
Wallace S. Wharton,
Captain, USNR.

Mr. J. E. Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
(Attention: Liaison Section)
Dept. of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

80-604-367
MAY 18 1945

EX-58

FIVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

60 JUN 27 1945

133

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

L2-1409-7

12 May 1945

Memorandum for: Mr. C. Darwin *open*

Subject: *O* Secret Writing

The following is transmitted for your information:

A sheet of paper is completely soaked with water, then it is placed on a smooth glass. A dry sheet is placed on top of the first sheet and the message written with a Faber No. 2 pencil. The wet sheet is then placed between blotters. When it is dry, a letter of some business nature is typed at right angles to the original message. When letter reached destination, it is thrown in a receptacle with water and the secret message read with ease.

J. George Gately
J. George Gately
X-2 Branch

RECORD

EX-12

80-604-368

53 MAY 28 1945

~~SECRET~~

adm-6

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

32

THE OFFICE OF CENSORSHIP
TECHNICAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

May 12, 1945

TECHNICAL OPERATIONS BULLETIN NO. 88

THE FOLLOWING IS RESTRICTED TO SSD PERSONNEL

SECRET INK EXAMINER TRAINING PROGRAM

The Laboratory Section of TOD has in preparation an outline for Secret Ink Examiner Training which is designed to assist the field stations in improving the general ability of the individual tester. Though the outline is technical in nature and will be of interest only to the S/I laboratories the introduction is of sufficient general interest to warrant presentation to the SSD personnel as a whole.

"It has always been one of the primary responsibilities of the Secret Ink Chemists to maintain an aggressive program of training aimed at continual improvement of testing quality and examiner ability. Such programs of examiner training have been in effect at all laboratories since the beginning of secret ink testing and much of the success of this training has been a direct result of the capable thinking and planning of the chemists themselves. No comprehensive outline for training in the technical aspects of secret ink testing has ever been issued by T.O.D., as it was felt that it was primarily the responsibility of each chemist in the field to develop such a program along his own lines, guided by basic material and examples sent by the T.O.D. laboratory.

"Certainly our present position with respect to the techniques being used by the enemy makes it imperative that we review thoroughly the status of our testing program from the standpoint of testing quality and examiner ability. It is apparent that many of the S/W methods now in use will be detected only through extremely careful and competent examination by examiners who are thoroughly familiar with the offensive techniques involved and with the correct use of defensive measures. From direct observation of the type of training carried on at the various stations, from contribution of material by the field laboratories, and from the results of discussions of the subject in T.O.D., we have prepared an outline which, we feel, should form the basis of an intensified training program to be instituted as soon as possible in each field laboratory. Much of the work on this training outline has been done at the CPSE laboratory, where it is already in active use as a training aid.

"It is well realized that the two most important factors which contribute to the success of secret ink operations are the following:

50 JUN 12 1945

~~SECRET~~

EX-26

180-604-369

MAY 22 1945

~~SECRET~~

1. "Adequate measures to insure referral of the best (most suspicious) portion of the total mail for testing, through the three established mechanisms of Watchlist, designated channels and examiner referral.
2. "Adequate measures to insure accurate testing of this mail by the careful and intelligent application of all available procedures.

"Information included in the training outline deals entirely with the second of these two factors - that which has to do with testing procedures.

"The attainment of a high degree of competence in testing depends not only upon a vigorous program of instruction and training, but also upon some method of measurement of the examiner's grasp of the problem and ability to do the work. Questions and answers on the various phases of the operation have proven useful in this connection, and it is felt that they can be made an integral part of future training programs.

"It is suggested that the future program of secret ink examiner training be planned along the following lines:

1. "A series of lectures and discussions designed to cover all of the details of the laboratory operation.

"This course of intensified instruction should, we feel, include the general and specific subjects listed in the training outline. The outline has been left in skeleton form for the reason that all of the points noted are discussed in some detail in the revised technical manual soon to be issued. For purposes of training the outline will serve as a ready reference to the technical manual where specific information on the points covered will be found. It has been found most effective to divide the entire laboratory personnel into small discussion groups for this type of training. A section of the outline can be covered systematically with each group and general discussion stimulated by the use of the questions and answers based on information in the technical manual.

2. "Intensification of the test letter principle. Frequent letters, complete discussion of each one.

"The use of test letters has been a most valuable method of checking on the efficiency of any phase of the testing operation. When used intelligently and with the proper attitude, they have been successful in locating deficiencies in the program which might otherwise have gone unnoticed. The following procedure is recommended:

2 -
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

"A suitable letter is selected from the unopened mail, steamed open, and the contents removed. The letter is simulated as accurately as possible, i.e. an exact reproduction is prepared using the same type of paper, handwriting, etc., as well as the exact message. The secret text is placed on the letter by whatever method is desired at the time. It is absolutely essential that the person in charge of the operation know the exact location of the test letter at all times, and it is important that all mail dispatched from the laboratory during this time be checked to be absolutely certain that the test letter is not released before replacing it with the bona fide communication.

"As mentioned before, it is possible, by the skilled use of this technique to test the accuracy of any phase of the operation. Letters can be prepared which should be detectable by the minor reagents, or they can be of the type which should be submitted for major examination or irremovable striping. Much of the effectiveness of the test letter principle depends upon the presentation of the reasons for detection or non-detection of the letter. If each case is thoroughly discussed with all of the examiners who are apt to encounter a similar situation, it will go a long way toward maintaining alertness.

3. "Measurement of examiner's knowledge and ability.

"There will probably never be a completely satisfactory method for determining to what extent the instructions and training material given to the examiners is retained by each individual, but it has been found helpful to use a series of questions and answers on the various phases of the operation. These questions are not meant for use as an examination in testing each examiner, but they will provide a reasonably accurate guide of just what information the examiner should have at his command in order to be a successful tester. The method of use of the questions is left to the discretion of each laboratory head. It may be helpful to prepare a set, or several sets, of cards with the questions on one side and the answers on the other, and make these available for examiner study. During the training discussions, an effort could be made to determine how much of the information has been mastered."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~*Special Security Committee
New Orleans*THE FOLLOWING IS FOR THE INFORMATION OF SSD PERSONNEL

TOD believes that all Special Security Department personnel will be interested in the following comments from the SSA of CPNO on the subject of SSA Listings:

"As our original SSA listings have been coming of age, that is, reaching the point where we consider them either for deletion or extension, we have also been reviewing the whole idea of permitting individual censorship stations to list persons of whom they are suspicious.

"To our way of thinking, there are two outstanding benefits from the plan. The first, of course, and you know more about it than we do since you have the over-all picture, is the contribution to Counter-Espionage objectives.

"There is a by-product, however, of which you may not be entirely aware. That is the impetus the listings have given the field stations at a time when it is difficult to maintain morale of examiners who feel that the war is already won. Of course I speak only for CPNO, but we cannot but feel that the effect must have been the same elsewhere.

"At our station each SSA Listing has been assigned to an individual examiner. In cases where it is possible, the assignment is given to the examiner in our Security Examination Section who first turned up the case, and he receives and studies all material pertinent to it. When the case matures he summarizes it for reporting. The opportunity for each examiner to use his initiative to the fullest extent has been a factor in stimulating hard work and good thinking, not only on the SSA cases, but also on the other work of the Security Examination Section. The cooperation we have had from other stations which have sent us cables, submissions, photostats and other reports of traffic on our listings has been an additional inspiration to us. And it has made us even more eager, if possible, to reciprocate when we can find material of value to them in their listings.

"One of the greatest problems facing a supervisor in censorship today is combatting an apathy engendered by the success of our armed forces. Though we recognize it as a universal problem in censorship, we also realize that the solution of it has to be local. The SSA listings have been our greatest single force to keep the readers of Security interest mail alert and enthusiastic."

CPNO also mentions a possible weakness in the mechanical operation of the system and we urge all SSD's to take steps similar to CPNO's in order to insure the prompt routing of such submissions on to SSD concerned.

- 4 -
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

"Not all stations which allocate us submission slips because of our SSA listings of names involved mark these slips 'Attention of the SSA' when they mail them out. Every once in a while one such slip, after wandering around our station, turns up at SSD. It makes us wonder if some reports do not just find their way to the station record files without ever reaching us. To be certain that the slips which we allocate because of SSA listings are properly mailed from CPNO, we visited the unit which mails the slips and found out that if the station listing appears in either the sender or addressee box, it is given the proper direction, but if it turns up in the body of the slip (which is not read by those doing the mailing) it would merely go to the station indicated in the allocation box. Hereafter we in SSD are flagging all slips which are to be sent to Special Security Assistants."

~~SECRET~~

TOB/88

~~SECRET~~

THE FOLLOWING IS RESTRICTED TO SSD PERSONNEL

*This information
is to be
kept in
the
SSD
only.*

Information received from a confidential source discloses that messages written on thin onion skin paper and concealed under the stamps of registered letters may be passing between Mexico and Colombia. Additional particulars are not available. Careful candling of selected mail in this channel should serve as an adequate safeguard.

- 7 -
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7c

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

L2-1409-4a

24 May 1945

Handwritten signature: E. C. Coffey

Handwritten initials: EDM

Memorandum for: Mr. C. Darwin Marron - 1517
Subject: ~~Secret Ink Pencils~~
Reference: Memorandum to Mr. John F. Doherty
dated 16 March 1945

The attached memorandum on the use of secret
inks supplements information contained in our reference
memorandum.

Handwritten: Secret Ink

Handwritten signature: J. George Gately
J. George Gately
X-2 Branch

Attachment

Handwritten: 59

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

180-604-370 *al*

53

MAY 24 1945

EX-20

Handwritten signature

3 JUN 5

1945

Handwritten: 357
Handwritten: 14

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

With regard to the first 'pencil' referred to, we have not yet seen any secret writing matches with camouflage coloring of the heads, though one or two reports we have received from time to time have indicated that such coloring has been thought of and possibly practiced by the enemy. Since we know 'Heinrich' as the common German code name for the [redacted] the use of this name strongly suggests that his match was [redacted]. It is likely that the term 'H' pencil refers to the same match.

b3 Per CIA
b7E

References to 'G' pencils have been met before. The likeliest explanation is that this means simply 'Geheim' pencil, equivalent to 'secret pencil' and thus a generic term. It should be remarked, however, that we know that the 'Heinrich' match is sometimes called 'Georg'.

If the agent is right in his belief that the initial letter of the signature indicated the pencil used, and if we may assume that this practice carries over to liquid inks, it may be (though this is a long shot) that the signature 'Robert' indicates an ink having a code name beginning with R. This may possibly be [redacted]

b3 Per CIA
b7E

*Induct slc
m/s*

RAC *Red*

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

80-604-370

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

I2-1409-8

23 May 1945

OFF 84-7
[Signature]

Memorandum for: Mr. C. Darwin Marron

Subject: ~~X~~ Formula for Secret Writing

The attached memorandum is transmitted for your
information:

[Signature]
J. George Gately
X-2 Branch

Attachment

Secret Writing

132
ENCLOSURE

JUN 14 1945

EX-29

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

80-604-371
MAY 29 1945

~~SECRET~~

EX-29

cm 5

~~SECRET~~

FORMULA FOR SECRET WRITING

b3 Per CIA
b7E

Take 20 to 30 centicubes [] and dissolve a coffee spoon of salt in it. Print with this ink on a piece of white paper, making an indication for future reference to mark the direction of the writing. After drying, put a piece of white paper under the writing and place it under a press for at least 24 hours. Take out the bottom sheet and write an ordinary letter on the back of it, crosswise to the original text.

To develope, dissolve some [] in a little water until it becomes white, soak a piece of cotton in the mixture and pass it lightly over the paper, on the opposite side to the ordinary letter. Dry the sheet, preferably in the sun, and the writing will appear written in reverse. Read it in a mirror.

RM

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

80-604-371

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON

9 May 1945

[Handwritten signatures]

h
Honorable John Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

b3 Per CIA
b7E
b7C

Dear Mr. Hoover:



56 JUN 25 1945

RECORDED & INDEXED
EX - 65

80-604-372

JUN 15 1945

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chamberlain
7412

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
June 13, 1945

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COURIER

Director, FBI

RE: TALCUM POWDER

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter of March 5, 1945, addressed to the Mexico City Office, a copy of which was designated for the Rio de Janeiro Office, requesting that various cans of talcum powder be transmitted.

The following talcum powder is being shipped via Steamer Pouch:

- 7 packages of Yardleys Men's Talcum
- 6 packages of Mennens Men's Talcum
- 6 packages of Dagelle Men's Talcum
- 3 packages of Seaforth Men's Talcum

Additional material of this nature will be transmitted as obtainable.

Very truly yours,

H. M. Clegg
HEBER M. CLEGG
L. A.

Secret Ink

100-19815-100
HMC:HH
94-0

Da

EX-26

100-604-374
FBI
29 JUN 26 1945

58 JUL 3 1945